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Abstract 
 
It has been well documented that the European Union (EU) began as an economic 
organization which now concerns itself with a variety of social issues, such as fundamental 
rights. This dissertation seeks to address a change in the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’s (CJEU) reasoning from that of the fundamental freedoms and free movement so 
closely linked to the economic community to fundamental rights, which has growing 
importance within all international organisations, particularly in the area of Police and 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). The dissertation looks specifically to the 
rights of victims; the European Arrest Warrant; and, the rights of suspects. It is argued that 
there has been an increase in rulings in favour of fundamental rights from the Court, 
although not always dealt with adequately. It is also contended that fundamental freedoms 
are taking a lesser role, as illustrated by these PJCC rulings on wholly internal situations. 
However it is also argued that at times fundamental rights and freedoms are not always 
competing but in fact fundamental rights and freedoms are competing against the 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation; mutual trust. 
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation aims to answer the following question: 
 
“Fundamental rights versus fundamental freedoms: A change 
in the reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union? A Critical Analysis of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’s Rulings in Police and Judicial Cooperation 
in Criminal Matters” 
 
It has been decided to concentrate on the rulings of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in the field of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters (PJCC). This focus has been chosen because of the fast paced development of 
EU law in this field, which is an important aspect of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (AFSJ) which has been established in the European Union (EU)1. 
Moreover, criminal matters, within the Member States, are inextricably linked to 
fundamental (human) rights. Thus using the Court’s rulings in PJCC would appear to 
be the obvious area to examine in order to ascertain whether there has been a real and 
significant change in the reasoning of the CJEU towards more fundamental rights 
based arguments as opposed to fundamental freedoms based arguments.  
 
It is submitted that this is a significant issue for a variety of reasons. Primarily, this 
would illustrate a further example of the development from what was initially the 
European Economic Community of six Member States with purely economic aims, to 
a European Union of twenty seven Member States (EU) which legislates in fields 
which are politically sensitive and fiercely protected by the Member States. Although 
the neofunctionalist theory of European integration has long been regarded as failing 
to account for the development of the EU2, there is little doubt that the idea of 
spillover which resonates from that theory provides for some kind of explanation of 
the EU’s role in the areas of PJCC and fundamental rights.  
 
Secondly, in light of the fact that the EU now takes a much stronger position with 
regard to fundamental rights, exemplified by the introduction of the Charter of 
                                                           
1 This thesis will refer to both the EU and the CJEU as opposed to the European Community (EC) and 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in line with the recent changes which were made in the Treaty of 
Lisbon. References to the EC Treaty will, however, remain. 
2 P. Craig and G. De Burca ‘EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials’ (4th Ed, OUP) p2  
 Word Count: 32474                                                                       11 of 102 
 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) as well as the Court 
looking to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for guidance on issues, it 
equates to the CJEU taking on a different type of role in these cases, and potentially 
more akin to the ECtHR in some instances. 
 
Thirdly, a change of attitude from the CJEU resulting in a lesser emphasis on 
fundamental freedoms and requirements for a cross border element is a strong 
indication that the CJEU (and the EU) are prepared to act in respect of areas which 
would, once upon a time, have been outwith their competence. Thus “wholly internal 
situations” have now been considered by the CJEU, without any need for an EU 
citizen to cross an internal border of the EU. Therefore it is submitted that issues on 
fundamental rights can be of greater importance than merely facilitating movement of 
EU citizens within the EU.  
 
Additionally, it is important to analyse to what extent this actually is the case; 
fundamental freedoms still play a key role in the EU and perhaps the emergence of 
fundamental rights language in the case law is merely incidental and with no 
significant effects or changes to the EU legal order. To evaluate whether the EU’s 
competences can be seen as having broadened as a result of a greater emphasis on 
fundamental rights within the national legal orders of the EU Member States is of key 
importance. This also raises fundamental issues concerning the scope of powers 
transferred to the EU by the Member States3 and the principle of subsidiarity.  
 
Thus the question posed in this dissertation illuminates the ever evolving nature of the 
EU’s legal order, its competences, and the CJEU’s reasoning, particularly in the area 
of PJCC.  
 
This dissertation will consist of four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter will 
provide a background to the development of the role of the EU and more specifically 
of the CJEU in the area of PJCC as well as in the area of fundamental rights. This will 
provide the background and context in which the case law is set. It will also consider 
the rather unusual (and somewhat complex) transitional provisions which remain in 
                                                           
3 Art. 5 TEU Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007  
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PJCC post-Lisbon Treaty4, even now when the pillar structure has been abolished. It 
will also refer to the protocol negotiated by the UK and Polish Governments on the 
status of the Charter. This chapter aims to set out the basis for the case law which is 
examined in the following chapters and also emphasises the importance of this area of 
competence for the Member States. 
 
This dissertation will then focus on the case law regarding distinct areas within 
PJCC.5 Regardless of whether one walks into the criminal courts of the Sheriff Court 
in Glasgow or the CJEU on a criminal matter, the evidence, the witnesses and the 
accused are all part of the colourful weave of that case. As such, the cases which are 
considered in this dissertation, even with regard to the same framework decision, are 
all markedly different. However this does not negate the analysis which can arise 
from looking at the Court’s reasoning in the various rulings.  
 
The cases which are referred to, it is contended, fall into the category of ‘hard cases’ 
as described by Bengoetxea, as the cases often surround the issue of ‘a conflict of 
norms’ or ‘antinomies’6.   
 
Therefore, the second chapter is based upon the case law on the Framework Decision 
on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings7. This will explain the aims and 
content of the Framework Decision and then provide a factual analysis of the 
(somewhat limited) case law on the Framework Decision. The chapter will then 
evaluate the use of fundamental rights as a method for reasoning within the cases and 
will evaluate to what extent the Court uses these fundamental rights in its 
interpretation and application of EU law. The chapter will then assess the lack of 
cross-border element in the case law and highlight the background to dealing with 
‘wholly internal situations’ within the EU. This chapter will conclude that within this 
particular field there is evidence to suggest that fundamental rights have greater 
                                                           
4 Treaty of Lisbon supra. n.3 
5 There are, however, a number of areas within PJCC which will not be dealt with such as the European 
Evidence Warrant. 
6 R. Bengoetxea ‘The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ (1993, OUP) at p.168 Due to 
word constraints less emphasis is placed on the methodological and philosophical aspects of the 
CJEU’s decisions than there might have been. See Bengoetxea for a full analysis.   
7 Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the Standing of the Victims in Criminal Proceedings, O.J. 
2001, L 82/1. 
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importance than the fundamental freedoms, which is demonstrated in the cases where 
there is a lack of cross-border element. It will note the limitations which this area has 
as an indicator of the practice across the various, widely diverging, areas within 
PJCC. Furthermore, it will note how the situation of the standing of victims in 
criminal proceedings is distinct from the situation in respect of the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW) where some form of cross-border element is present.  
 
This then leads into chapter three which is case law which has arisen as a result of the 
Framework Decision on the EAW8. Similarly this chapter will examine the aims and 
the substance of the EAW itself. The chapter will then go on to examine the case law 
within this area. It will then be discussed to what extent the CJEU uses fundamental 
rights to make their rulings, and how great a weight the Court gives to such arguments 
within their reasoning. A key issue in this chapter is the fact that contrary to the 
standing of victims in criminal proceedings case law, there must be a cross-border 
element, but can interestingly refer to a national being requested to return to their 
home state or being requested to return to another EU Member State from their home 
state. The link between the EAW, the Convention Implementing the Schengen 
Agreement (CISA) and the ne bis in idem case law will thus be underlined. The CISA 
cases will be further analysed and it will be argued that in this instance although there 
may be a very clear cross-border element, however, fundamental rights as reasoning 
from the CJEU is still on the increase. This development is perhaps not to the 
detriment of the fundamental freedoms within EU law but rather raising the EU rights 
to a higher standard which should be expected of a Union of twenty seven democratic 
states who respect fundamental rights and freedoms, as stated in Article 6 of the 
Treaty on the European Union. The question thus arises as to how the Court can 
develop further. It will be proposed that as the Court has developed its use of 
fundamental rights (as well as looking to the ECtHR) within its reasoning then it can 
be foreseen that the Court will continue to do so within other areas of PJCC. It is also 
contended that in certain instances it is actually either competing fundamental rights 
which are the issue or in other circumstances mutual trust and recognition is pitted 
against fundamental rights and freedoms.   
 
                                                           
8 Council Framework Decision  2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States  
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Therefore, the fourth chapter will look at the developing procedural guarantees for 
suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings within the EU. The somewhat 
controversial development within this area of EU law will be discussed, particularly 
in light of the fact that it is often considered that legislative measures within PJCC 
have been more aimed towards the catching, prosecuting and punishment of criminals 
than any kind of protection of defendants throughout the process9. Thus this chapter 
will proceed to analyse how the Court may follow in line with the case law on the 
Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims. However it will be questioned as to 
whether there is a proper legal basis for this in the Treaty, even though it is suggested 
that following the Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims is preferable. The 
Court is still likely to be using fundamental rights based arguments and most likely 
using the Charter, the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law to reach a conclusion in its 
rulings. Thus this chapter will argue that the CJEU will be acting in a greater capacity 
as a ‘guardian’ of fundamental rights than of the fundamental freedoms.  
 
This dissertation will conclude by suggesting that within the area of PJCC, the CJEU 
has become, and is more liable in the future to be, more interested in fundamental 
rights arguments than in the past. There are several points to be made in this regard. 
First it is argued that due to the nature of the issues which arise within PJCC it is only 
natural, if not blindingly obvious, that the Court would have to take on a stronger role 
with regard to fundamental rights. That being said however, there has been a general 
growth in the EU (and thus the CJEU’s) competences which has led to the Court 
expanding its jurisdiction within this area. Moreover, the Court could have continued 
to follow the reasoning of the ECtHR, without having to truly further its own position 
regarding fundamental rights. But this has not been the case. The EU has made the 
Charter legally binding on all Member States10 and the Court now makes reference to 
the Charter and can be seen to be taking fundamental rights seriously. It will be 
argued in the conclusion that the reality of the case law on the Framework Decision 
on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings necessarily means that the Court 
is often looking at situations which lack any kind of cross-border element. This 
                                                           
9 L. Van Puyenbroeck and G. Vermeulen ‘Towards minimum procedural guarantees for the defence in 
criminal proceedings in the EU’ 2011 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ) Vol. 60(4)  
pp.1017-1038 at p.1017 
10 With the exception of the UK and Poland who negotiated an opt-out; see Protocol on the application 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and the United Kingdom 
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therefore entails a lack of any real discussion of the fundamental freedoms which the 
Union citizens have. Moreover, it will be argued that at times, greater attention could 
be paid to fundamental rights arguments. However, from issues which arise from the 
Schengen acquis as well as the EAW case law, there is still a very strong cross-border 
element. Thus in turn there is a connection to the fundamental freedoms. However, it 
will also be contended that there are other pressures which the Court considers such as 
mutual rights and mutual recognition. It will be noted that this is not to suggest that 
fundamental rights arguments have no role in the Court’s reasoning in such instances 
but rather these arguments fall alongside those of fundamental rights.  
 
Thus it is suggested in this instance that there has been a change in the reasoning of 
the CJEU towards fundamental rights. However this is not to suggest that the Court is 
not taking its’ role on fundamental freedoms any less seriously than it once would 
have, but merely to stress that the Court is looking at a wider range of issues, 
including human rights and mutual recognition, in instances that once upon a time it 
would not have concerned itself with, such as ‘wholly internal situations’. It will also 
be argued that in light of the ever growing body of human rights case law, it is not 
only of the utmost importance for the Court as part of an international organisation to 
uphold fundamental rights, but it is necessary.  
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Chapter 1: The Development of Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matter, Fundamental Rights and 
the Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter’s objective is to put the development in the Court’s case law concerning 
Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) and Fundamental Rights 
into an overall context. The later chapters explore the reasoning in the rulings and the 
potential changes in the Court’s reasoning within these fields. This chapter will 
primarily show that, somewhat ironically, neither area was at the forefront of what 
was the European Economic Community’s priorities or aims. However, they have 
become more important overall and eventually the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) has been granted competence over new areas by the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
1.2 Development of the CJEU’s Competences in respect of Fundamental 
Rights1 
1.2.1 Early Development of Fundamental Rights 
 
As has been noted by Craig and De Búrca, “The original three European Community 
Treaties, signed in the 1950s, contained no provisions concerning the protection of 
human rights. More than fifty years since the first of the Communities was founded, 
this position has changed considerably.”2 It has been well documented that the 
original Treaties had no provisions relating to human rights as the EEC was originally 
an economic enterprise.3  However, the issue of fundamental rights soon became an 
issue before the Court. Initially the Court appeared reluctant to allow litigation 
regarding rights recognised by national law, even when they were fundamental 
                                                           
1   In this text the term human rights and the term fundamental rights are used synonymously. It should 
be noted that Human Rights in the European Union is a huge topic within itself and that this chapter 
only provides the basis necessary upon which the rest of this thesis will follow. See for instance P. 
Alston ‘The EU and Human Rights’ (OUP, 1999) and S. Peers and A. Ward ‘The European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ (OUP, 2000) 
2 P. Craig and G. De Búrca ‘EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials’ (OUP, 4th Ed) at p.379 
3 ibid.  
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rights4. In the Stork case5, the Courts refused to countenance arguments that the 
institutions had violated some right protected in national laws. This was then followed 
by the Stauder case6. The facts of the case were that the Commission adopted a 
decision designed to reduce Community butter stocks by allowing butter to be sold at 
a lower price to people on welfare schemes. To get the better, a voucher had to be 
produced with your name on it in Germany and Holland, but this was not necessary in 
France or Italy. Stauder, a German national challenged the requirement saying that it 
violated his right to privacy. The national court made a preliminary reference to the 
CJEU. The Court indicated that the more liberal French and Italian methods should be 
adopted so as not to prejudice the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general 
principles of Community law, and should be protected by the Court. Thus if there 
were two options open to the national courts then it should choose the one which 
would protect fundamental rights. One commentator noted that, “Human rights still 
occupied no more than a second-order status of EC law”7. Although the Stauder case 
noted the importance of EC law and ideas of fundamental rights, these notions were 
not given an “organic status” which would allow them to be used for steering the 
actions of EU authorities or as a ground of judicial review.8 Nonetheless, the 
importance of this case has been noted: 
 
“…it is unlikely that the Union would have reached this stage 
if the Court had not taken that small first step in Stauder v 
Ulm”9 
 
There were subsequently more changes in the way in which the Court ruled on the 
issue of fundamental rights. This came as a result of judgments from both the German 
and Italian Constitutional Courts, where a belief was expressed that the provisions of 
their Constitutions, based upon fundamental human rights, were not being adequately 
protected by the EU, and as such their respective constitutions would reign supreme 
over EU law with regard to issues of fundamental rights10. Therefore one of the 
                                                           
4 Case 1/58 Stork v High Authority [1959] ECR 17; Cases 36, 37, 38 and 40/59 Greitling v High 
Authority [1960] ECR 423; Case 40/64 Sgarlata and others v Commission [1965] ECR 215  
5 Case 1/58 [1959] ECR 17 
6 Case 29/69 [1969] ECR 419 
7 D. Chalmers and A. Tomkins ‘European Union Public Law’ (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 
p.296  
8  ibid.  
9  A. Arnull ‘The European Union and its Court of Justice’ (OUP, 1999) at p.223 
10 Solange I BVerfGE 37, 271 2 BvL 52/71, 29  May 1974 (also known as Internationale 
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principal reasons “for the Court’s declaration that fundamental rights formed part of 
the EU legal order was the challenge posed to the supremacy of EU law by Member 
State courts which felt that EU legislation was encroaching upon important rights 
protected under national law.”11 The Court dealt with this problem through 
interpretation and stated that “the protection of fundamental rights was indeed a 
general principle of European Community law.”12 
 
Thus the Court followed up the rulings in the Stork and Stauder cases with that of 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft13, in which there was an EU regulation which 
awarded Internationale Handesgesellschaft a licence to export maize on the condition 
that they put down a deposit which would be forfeited if the maize was not delivered 
on time. They failed to deliver the maize and challenged the forfeiture of the deposit 
before the German Administrative Court. It was alleged, that such forfeiture violated 
the German Constitutional provisions of freedom to trade and the requirement that all 
public action should be proportionate. The point was made in this ruling that, 
“Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the validity 
of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would have an adverse 
effect of the uniformity and efficacy of Community law.”14 The CJEU thus 
established that fundamental rights form an integral part of EU law, even although 
there had been no infringement of the rights claimed. These cases underline the 
beginning of a long journey on fundamental rights. It has been noted that, “In the 
absence of a catalogue of such [fundamental] rights in the Treaty, however, it was not 
at that stage clear which rights would be regarded by the Court as fundamental.”15 It 
has been evidenced that the Court used the formulation of ‘general principles’ of EU 
law as the way to equip the EU with fundamental rights. However, the Court then 
looked to other sources to provide direction. This could be found in looking to both 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), national constitutions and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Handesgesellschaft, discussed further below)and Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze [1974] 2 CMLR 
372   
11   Craig and De Búrca supra. n.2 at p.383 
12   J. Coppel and A. O’Neill “The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?”1992 
Common Market Law Review (CMLR) Vol.29 pp.669-692 at p.671  
13 Case 11/70 [1970] ECR 1125 
14 ibid. at para. 3 of the Ruling 
15 A. Arnull supra. n.9 at p.204  
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1.2.2 Reliance on the ECHR and the Charter 
For the first time, the Court looked specifically to international human rights 
instruments in the case of Nold v Commission16. The Court stated that rights protected 
in Member State constitutions and international human rights treaties were sources of 
fundamental rights in the EU. Thus this brought the ECHR into play, as well as, for 
instance, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In the 
Rutili v Minister for the Interior case17, the ECHR was specifically mentioned by the 
CJEU and has since been referred to frequently in the Court’s case law. An example is 
the case of Hoechst AG v Commission18, concerning EU competition law which 
examined the investigation by the European Commission into anti-competitive 
practices. The Court looked at Article 8 of ECHR, but held that the right to privacy 
did not extend to private premises. The Court was criticised for its decision in this 
case by those who considered that the Court had dismissed the argument too quickly. 
They commented that the Court had also ignored the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) case law. Moreover it has been noted by commentators that the Court 
did not give the level of protection for human rights which would have been achieved 
at the national level.19 Interestingly in a subsequent case in the ECtHR in Niemiez v 
Germany20 it was held that business premises were included and the judgment relied 
on the CJEU case of Roquette Frères SA v Commission 21. 
 
Once the CJEU accepted it had jurisdiction, the Court considered fundamental rights 
through a number of cases22. The Wachauf case was one of the ‘milk quota’ cases, 
and the judgment declared that the protection of fundamental rights was also binding 
on Member States when implementing EU rules, and in the ERT judgment, the Court 
expanded the point. Moreover in the Cinéthèque and SPUC cases, the Court noted 
that the EU could not determine cases which were outwith EU law. ERT also provided 
an example of allowing a Member State to derogate from EU law measures as a result 
                                                           
16 Case 4/73 [1974] ECR 491  
17 Case 36/75 [1975] ECR 1219 
18 Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88 [1989]   
19 P. Craig and G. De Búrca supra. n.2 at p.393 
20 Series A, No.251 (1992) 16 EHRR 97  
21 Case C-94/00 [2002] ECR I-9011 
22 Cases 60-1/84 Cinéthèque and others v Fédération nationale des cinémas français [1985] ECR 
2605; Case 5/88 Wachauf v Federal Republic of Germany [1989] ECR 2609; Case 260/89 Elleniki 
Radiophonia Tileorasi (ERT) v Dimotiki Etairia Plirofissis and Sotirios Kouvelas [1991] ECR I-2925; 
Case 159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd v Stephen Grogan and 
others [1991] ECR I-4685.  
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of fundamental rights. It was felt, notably, by commentators Coppell and O’Neill that 
the use of fundamental rights in some cases has been used by the Court to expand the 
competences of the EU into areas up until then reserved for national legislation. As 
such they believed that the Court has used fundamental rights instrumentally in order 
to accelerate legal integration.23   
 
However, as well as using the ECHR and the national constitutions to provide 
guidance on fundamental rights, the Charter is now24 a legally binding25 source of 
rights within the EU.   Article 6(1) TEU (as amended by Lisbon) states: 
 
“the Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set 
out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights…which shall have 
the same legal value as the Treaties”.  
 
However, even before the Charter was considered a legally binding document on the 
Member States, it was referred to by Advocates General and then finally in rulings of 
the Court. The CJEU itself first referred to the Charter in a ruling regarding those 
rights contained within Chapter V, those on citizens’ rights26. The Court finally 
mentioned the Charter in a case regarding the Family Reunification Directive27. It has 
been suggested that, “The seal of approval finally given by the Court to the Charter as 
a significant source of the general principles of EC law confirms that the Charter has 
definitely entered the constitutional practice of the EU…”28 Thus the Charter now 
stands strong alongside other international instruments and national constitutions as a 
source of fundamental rights for developing the EU’s legal order, and marks the 
development and significance of fundamental rights within the EU today. 
 
                                                           
23 J. Coppel and A. O’Neill supra. n.9 at p.691  
24 The Charter was not previously legally binding although it was set to be legally binding in the failed 
Constitutional Treaty; it was previously solemnly proclaimed by the Commission, Parliament, and 
Council and was politically approved by the Member State at the Nice European Council summit in 
December [2000] OJ  C364/1 
25 This does not apply to the United Kingdom nor Poland who negotiated a protocol against making the 
Charter legally binding, see Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom. 
26 Case T-54/99 max. mobil Telekommunikation Service GmbH v Commission [2002] ECR II-313, 
para.48 
27 Case C-540/03 European Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769 
28 P. Craig and G. De Búrca supra.n.2 at p.418 
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1.2.3 Position of Fundamental Rights within a Hierarchy of Norms 
It has been proffered by Coppel and O’Neill that “fundamental rights are commonly 
regarded as being at the peak of the normative hierarchy of laws against which other 
rules of law are to be measured.”29 It is submitted that this contention is correct with 
regard to a Member State legal system and should now also apply to the sui generis 
EU legal system. However, in the case of EU law, fundamental rights were not always 
seen to be the most important norms: 
“Most authors are agreed that the hierarchical standing of 
these fundamental principles [human rights] ranks higher than 
derived Community law, and some even claim they rank 
higher than Community law.”30 
 
One commentator who has always put fundamental rights at the top of the hierarchy 
within the EU legal order is Dauses.31 However, it has been argued that the CJEU is 
less than willing to put fundamental rights at the forefront of its legal reasoning and 
affords more weight to fundamental freedoms. It has been noted that, “…in the cases 
in which the Court has adopted fundamental rights discourse, it has been the general 
Community rule or the Community objective which has prevailed against claims as to 
the violation of fundamental rights.”32  
 
This point is expanded latterly by Coppel and O’Neill who make a very interesting 
assertion: 
“From the terms of the Heylens decision it appears that the 
four freedoms of workers, services, goods and capital 
enshrined in the Treaties can be translated into individuals’ 
fundamental rights. It would seem, then, that there is no 
distinction and hence no hierarchical relationship being 
posited by the European Court between the basic human rights 
outlined, for example, in the European Convention of Human 
Rights and the free market rights arising out of the Treaties of 
the Community.”33   
 
In relation to this point, there is evidence to suggest that fundamental rights are 
receiving more than mere lip service. This is evinced by the now legally binding 
nature of the Charter and a higher frequency of fundamental rights discussions within 
                                                           
29 J. Coppel and A. O’Neill supra.n.9 at p.682 
30 J. Bengoetxea ‘The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ (1993, OUP) at p.77 
31 M.A.Dauses ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal Order’ 1985 
Vol.10European Law Review (ELRev) pp.398-419 at p.407 
32 J. Coppel and A. O’Neill supra.n.9 at p.682 
33 ibid. at  p.690 
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the judgments and rulings of the Court. This, it is contended, is supplemented by the 
increase in areas of EU law which are more closely linked to the overt requirements 
of fundamental rights; such as that of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters (PJCC). Moreover, the view put forward by Coppel and O’Neill has been 
strenuously criticised by Weiler and Lockhart34. It is contended that although Coppel 
and O’Neill’s analysis may be a rather sweeping generalization, however, it is argued 
that their analysis does have some weight and cannot simply be ignored. 
 
1.3 Development of the CJEU within PJCC   
1.3.1 Early Development of the Third Pillar 
As has been explained by Peers, the cooperation within the field of Justice and Home 
Affairs (now known as Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters35) which 
was “initially agreed informally, was formalized by the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), inserting it in the intergovernmental Title VI of that 
Treaty.”36 
 
This is not particularly surprising given the political sensitivity of these matters. Thus 
this field of activity was kept outside the more supranational based EC pillar and put 
outside the jurisdiction of the CJEU. Whilst PJCC was located in the third pillar of the 
Treaty of Maastricht “The EU’s Court of Justice had no mandatory jurisdiction…”37 
However, it was stated in the TEU38 that the Court could have jurisdiction to interpret 
or settle disputes concerning Conventions; this was the situation in which the Court 
had jurisdiction over Justice and Home Affairs.  
 
This situation was changed by Article 23 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Article 23 
which alongside Declaration 10 of the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam gives the 
Court jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on Conventions (as was already 
provided for in Maastricht) but also, as laid out in Article 35(1) “on the validity and 
interpretation of framework decisions and decisions, on interpretation of Conventions 
                                                           
34 J.H.H.Weiler and N.J.S.Lockhart “Taking rights seriously ‘Seriously: The European Court and its 
fundamental rights jurisprudence” 1995 CMLR Vol.32 pp.51-94, pp579-627 
35 As a result of Treaty amendment, when certain issues such as asylum and immigration moving to the 
EC Pillar 
36 S. Peers ‘Human Rights and the Third Pillar’ in P. Alston supra.n.1 at p.167 
37 S. Peers ‘EU Justice and Human Affairs Law’ (OUP, 2nd Ed) at p.17 
38 Ex Article K.3(2)(c) EU  
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established under this Title and on the validity and interpretation of measures 
implementing them.” The Member States opted-in to the jurisdiction of the Court over 
PJCC in a variety of ways. Twelve of the fifteen Member States opted-in (France 
opted-in slightly later) to accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over the third pillar 
matters39. The UK (notoriously awkward with regard to variable geometry within the 
EU), Ireland and Denmark negotiated opt-outs to the Court’s jurisdiction. The Czech 
Republic and Hungary, two of the ten Member States who joined in 2004 have also 
opted in40. There were also arrangements regarding which national courts would have 
jurisdiction to request a preliminary ruling: 
 
“Of the fourteen Member States accepting the Court’s 
jurisdiction, all except Spain and Hungary permit all national 
courts or tribunals to send questions. Nine Member States 
reserved the right to require their final courts to refer (the 
exceptions are Greece, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and 
Hungary).”41 
 
An exception to the Court’s jurisdiction was found in Article 35(5) which states that 
the Court of Justice cannot rule on issues of internal security nor on the maintenance 
of a Member State’s law and order. Article 35(6) confers the power of direct judicial 
review. The Court’s jurisdiction has been exercised on a number of occasions to rule 
on these matters.42 
 
1.3.2 The Treaty of Lisbon (LT)  
The LT brought in several changes and, more specifically, in relation to the CJEU and 
PJCC43. It has been commented that, “The changes made to the jurisdiction of the 
courts by the Treaty of Lisbon are more drastic. This is partially due to the abolition 
of the pillar structure of the Union, and partially motivated by concerns of legal 
protection.”44 Thus there has been action taken in the CJEU’s favour by allowing the 
Court to continue to deliver rulings in cases regarding PJCC. As it has been put by 
                                                           
39 [1999] OJ C 120/24 
40 [2005] OJ L 327/19  
41  S. Peers supra. n.37 at p.41 
42 Some of which are subject to subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
43 Specific reference is made to the changes in EU criminal law in S.Peers ‘EU criminal law and the 
Treaty of Lisbon’ 2008 ELRev Vol.33(4) pp.507-529  
44 F. de Witte ‘The European Judiciary after Lisbon’ 2008 Maastricht Journal of International 
Comparative Law (MJ) Vol 15(1) pp.43-54 at p.45  
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one commentator, the LT “grants the Court almost unlimited jurisdiction.”45 
 
The changes have been noted as entailing “the application of the Court’s normal 
jurisdiction to criminal and policing issues, with a five-year transition period as 
regards third pillar measures adopted before the entry into force of the new Treaty. On 
the other hand, for the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, the effect of the 
various changes is limited because of their opt-outs concerning JHA law…”46  Thus 
there are still somewhat complex (potentially more so now than ever) opt-outs in 
place for these three Member States.47 An interesting point in relation to this is put 
forward by Peers: 
 
“The most striking aspect of the Court’s ruling in Segi is the 
absence of any mention of the situation in Member States 
which have not opted in to the Court’s preliminary rulings 
jurisdiction, and in particular the consequences of the situation 
as regards the legality of Third Pillar measures.”48 
 
It seems that such Member States are still bound by the rulings of the Court in the 
Third Pillar but rather unusually cannot make a preliminary reference to the Court. 
 
With regard to the Court having ‘normal’ jurisdiction from 2014 (the date in which 
the transitional period will have elapsed), in PJCC issues, this is described as a 
‘welcomed’ change unlike the specific provisions relating to three Member States.49 
Article 35 (referred to above) is therefore repealed and Article 267 on preliminary 
rulings applies to PJCC. There is however still an exception: 
“The exception is Article 276 TFEU which continues to 
preclude the ECJ from reviewing the validity or 
proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other 
law enforcement services of Member States or the exercise of 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regards 
to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
                                                           
45 F. de Witte supra. n.44. at p.49  
46 S.Peers  supra. n.43 at p.508 
47 For a comprehensive look at these provisions see M. Fletcher ‘Schengen, the European Court of 
Justice and flexibility under the Lisbon Treaty: balancing the United Kingdom’s “ins” and “outs”’ 
2009 European Constitutional Law Review (EuConst. LR) Vol.5(1) pp.71-98  
48 S.Peers ‘Salvation outside the Church: Judicial Protection in the Third Pillar after the Pupino and 
Segi Rulings’ 2007 CMLR Vol.44 pp.883-929 at p.900 
49 P. Craig ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, process, architecture and substance’ 2008 ELRev Vol.33(2) pp.137-
166 at p.143-144 
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internal security.”50 
 
Thus the exception set out in Article 35(7) still prevails. Until 2014 the pre-Lisbon 
jurisdiction will apply.    
1.4 Fundamental Rights and PJCC  
It has been commented that, “As the Community assumes far greater administrative 
and legislative responsibility in relation to Justice and Home Affairs, the need to 
assure, at Community level, the rights of those affected by this new jurisdiction 
becomes more pressing.”51 It is quite clear that where criminal justice is concerned, it 
is of prime importance that those involved in the process have adequate protection. 
There are particular rights which are enshrined in the Charter which are likely to be of 
the utmost importance to those involved in criminal justice. These are the rights 
featured in Chapter VI entitled Justice. These rights “include[s] several of the so-
called rights of the defence, such as the right to a fair trial, the presumption of 
innocence, the principle of legality and proportionality of penalties, and the familiar 
EC right to an effective remedy.”52 
 
1.4.1 Right to a fair trial 
It has been commented that “Human rights measures do not generally have a direct 
impact upon substantive criminal law.”53 However with regard to such measures, the 
most important provisions are those of legality and non-retroactivity which is 
enshrined in Article 7 of the ECHR as well as in the Charter. It is explained that these 
rights are expanded in the Charter: 
 
“The EU’s Charter of Rights contains the principles of legality 
and non-retroactivity of criminal liability, along with the 
principle of retroactive effect of more lenient penalties, and 
the principle that criminal penalties should be proportionate to 
the offence.”54  
 
However the majority of human rights issues arise in terms of procedural criminal 
                                                           
50 P. Craig supra. n.49 at p.143 
51 P. Alston and J.H.H. Weiler “An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The 
European Union and Human Rights’ P. Alston supra. n.1 at p.17 
52 Craig and De Búrca supra.n.2 at p.413 
53 S. Peers supra.n.37 at p.388  
54 ibid. at p.389; Art 49 of the Charter 
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law. These come in the form of Article 6 ECHR right to a fair trial. The rights 
enshrined in this article include the presumption of innocence (Article 6(2)) as well as 
minimum rights to be informed promptly of an accusation, to have time and facilities 
for a defence and to have access to a defence lawyer and an interpreter free of charge 
in Article 6(3). There has been a wide variety of case law on the right to a fair trial in 
ECtHR55, and it is an issue of utmost importance for the CJEU to ensure protection of 
these rights within the EU.  
 
1.4.2 The ‘ne bis in idem’ principle 
Rights coming from the ne bis in idem principle are also of prime importance in this 
area. This principle is obviously of great importance when considering the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW) as well as regarding the Schengen Convention56. The principle 
ensures that people are not tried multiple times for the same crime in different states. 
It has been pointed out that, “It must be admitted that in one area, EU third-pillar 
measures have contributed to human rights protection that diminished it: the support 
for an international non bis in idem principle.”57 It was stated that this principle was 
“among the first third-pillar references reaching the Court of Justice. The Court will 
thus have an early opportunity to show that it ‘takes rights seriously’ in the third 
pillar.”58 This principle, which is dealt with in the ECHR59 and ICCPR60, is an 
important principle upon which the EU puts a strong weight, particularly in light of 
the Schengen Convention and more recently, the increase in criminal type 
proceedings in the CJEU.   
 
1.4.3 Segi61 and Gestoras Pro Amnistía62 
The cases of Segi and Gestoras Pro Amnistía demonstrate the interaction between 
                                                           
55 The relevant CJEU cases which look at the issue of the right to a fair trial are dealt with throughout 
this thesis; the Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285 being of particular interest. 
56 Issues dealt with in chapter 3 of this thesis  
57 S. Peers ‘Human Rights and the Third Pillar’ in P. Alston supra.n.1 at p.185 
58 ibid. 
59 Article 4(1) of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR 
60 Article 14 
61 Case C-355/04 P Segi and Others v Council of the European Union (Spain and United Kingdom, 
intervening at first instance) [2007] CMLR 23 
62 Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Others v Council of the European Union (Spain and 
United Kingdom, intervening at first instance) [2007] 2 CMLR 22 
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fundamental rights and PJCC63. In these cases, the Basque organisations brought 
claims as a result of being included in a list of terrorist groups appended to a 
‘Common Position’ on combating terrorism. The fundamental right which the 
organisations believed was at issue was that of the right to effective judicial 
protection. It was argued that they essentially had no way of challenging their 
inclusion on the list and as a result they had no right to effective judicial protection. 
The Court did, in the Segi judgment, refer to rights in the ECHR64. However, it was 
held, in both cases, that the contention that they did not have a right to effective 
judicial remedy was incorrect and both cases failed. The Segi case is described as 
being, “consistent with, on the one hand, the Treaty’s broad tasks and objectives and, 
on the other hand, with the intentions of the Treaty drafters to limit the extent of 
integration within the third pillar.”65 As such, it appears that the Segi judgment allows 
the Court to broadly look at fundamental rights and develop issues regarding damages 
in the Third Pillar. It is submitted that this case may have had a different outcome had 
it taken place when the transitional provisions had passed and the third pillar falls 
within the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court.   
 
Interestingly this case went to both the CJEU and the ECtHR66. Notably however, the 
ECtHR did not decide the case based upon the issue of jurisdiction; instead the 
ECtHR stated that the organisations did not fall within the meaning of ‘victim’ within 
the Convention.   
 
1.5 Conclusion  
It has been noted that, “JHA [Justice and Home Affairs] has thus moved from the 
outer fringes of European integration towards the centre, more than two decades since 
the start of Trevi.”67 It is suggested that this applies specifically to PJCC , the latter 
mutation of JHA, as well as to fundamental rights. This can be seen through the 
growth in their importance more generally as well as with regard to the Court.  
                                                           
63 As well as the former second pillar of Common Foreign Security Policy (which still exists to some 
extent within the Lisbon Treaty) 
64 Case C-355/04 P at para.34 of the judgment 
65 S. Peers supra. n.48 at p.929 
66 App. Nos. 6422/02 and 9916/02, SEGI v The Fifteen Member States of the EU, admissibility 
decision of the ECtHR of 23 May 2002 
67 M. den Boer and W. Wallace ‘Justice and Home Affairs. Integration through Incrementalism?” in 
Wallace and Wallace “Policy-Making in the European Union” (4th Ed., OUP)  at p.518 
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The development of the CJEU has been a gradual one and “the increasingly important 
contribution to the law of the AFSJ that is now being made by the European Court of 
Justice”68 has already been noted. However, the difficulty of the CJEU playing a 
greater role within PJCC has been underlined by Peers: 
“National criminal and policing laws must always strike a 
familiar difficult balance. Established civil liberties principles 
require protection for the rights of suspects, but concern for 
public safety leads Member States to strive for effective 
investigations and prosecutions.”69 
 
Thus the pressures on national criminal justice systems become more complex when 
dealing with the cross-border crime which allegedly increases as a result of the 
fundamental free movement freedoms which arise as a result of EU membership, and 
thus it is key that fundamental rights are protected.  
 
It is concluded that Coppel and O’Neill’s contention that fundamental freedoms are 
given equal weight to fundamental rights and that the Court does not ‘take rights 
seriously’ is slightly outdated and partially exaggerated, as demonstrated by Weiler 
and Lockhart. However, it is agreed that the extent that fundamental freedoms are 
really what the EU has been about for such a long time and thus fundamental rights 
have only recently become a serious issue. Therefore, the subsequent chapters will 
focus on specific areas and contend that there has been a greater movement towards 
fundamental rights issues in the case law. Furthermore the changes to the jurisdiction 
of the Court brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon are to be welcomed to allow the 
Court to deliver preliminary rulings in this area of competence in the EU.     
                                                           
68 E. Baker “The European Union’s “Area of Freedom, Security and (Criminal) Justice” ten years on” 
2009 Criminal Law Review (Crim LR) Vol.12 pp.833-850 at p.834 
69 S. Peers ‘Human Rights and the Third Pillar’ in P. Alston supra.n.1 at p.186 
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Chapter 2: The Court of Justice of the European Union and Victims’ 
Rights 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to assess whether the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU)1 is taking a greater role in examining fundamental rights issues as opposed to 
fundamental freedoms issues within the case law which exists upon the Framework 
Decision on the Standing of the Victims in Criminal Proceedings2.  
 
In order to assess this, the author will primarily explain the context in which the 
Framework Decision was adopted. Then an analyses of the cases based upon this 
Framework Decision will proceed. It will then be argued that some of the cases do 
have strong fundamental rights themes to them, however what is more striking is the 
lack of cross-border element and as such the willingness of the Court to judge in such 
areas may mean that fundamental freedoms necessarily has a lesser role in victims’ 
rights issues and thus in the overall area of Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters (PJCC).  
 
2.2 Framework Decision on the Standing of the Victims in Criminal 
Proceedings 
The Commission adopted a Communication3, and noted that within it there were 
situations where an EU citizen is the victim of a crime in another EU Member State 
and thus it is imperative that the victim has access to justice. This led to the scrutiny 
of national procedures relating to victims in the Member States and was part of the 
Action Plan on the optimal way of achieving an area of freedom, security and justice 
(AFSJ). There was a strong emphasis on being a victim of crime in another Member 
State, and issues such as linguistic requirements featured4 in the build-up to the 
                                                           
1 The Treaty of Lisbon renamed the European Court of Justice (ECJ) the Court of Justice of the 
European Union as stated in Article 19 TEU. The case law however will refer to the ECJ. The term 
Court will also refer to the ECJ/CJEU and will be used to mean this unless otherwise stated. 
2 Framework Decision of 15 March 2001, O.J. 2001, L 82/1. 
3 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic 
and Social Committee of 14 July 1999 - Crime victims in the European Union - Reflexions on 
standards and action [COM(1999) 349 FINAL] 
4 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic 
and Social Committee of 14 July 1999 - Crime victims in the European Union - Reflexions on 
standards and action [COM(1999) 349 FINAL] 
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adoption of the Framework Decision. It was decided at the European Council meeting 
in Tampere in October 1999 that minimum standards should be created to protect the 
victims of crime. 
 
Such a move by the Commission to contend with the rights of victims fell in line with 
moves by other international organisations5. It should be noted that the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR) does not 
specifically deal with victims’ rights but instead enshrines the right to a fair trial of 
the defendant in Article 66. Moreover, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (‘the Charter’), under Chapter VI entitled ’Justice’ does not mention 
the rights afforded to victims7. However the idea of victims’ rights is linked to the 
idea of dignity which is mentioned within the Framework Decision which states “The 
rules and practices as regards the standing and main rights of victims need to be 
approximated, with particular regard to the right to be treated with respect for their 
dignity…”8  and dignity is also enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter.  
 
Therefore, the Framework Decision was based on fundamental rights issues as well as 
cross-border issues arising from persons becoming victims of crime in a Member 
State other than their own. There are 19 Articles within the Framework Decision and 
include Articles on respect and recognition (Article 2); right to receive information 
(Article 4); penal mediation in the course of criminal proceedings (Article 10); and, 
victims resident in another Member State (Article 11). Interestingly the Commission 
has presented a proposal for a new directive in this field9, and so the legislative 
journey regarding victims’ rights continues. 
 
                                                           
5 The UN has the 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power; and, the 2006 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law.  
6 ECHR Article 6 
7 This chapter relates to an effective remedy and a fair trial (Article 47); Presumption of innocence and 
right of defence (Article 48); Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and 
penalties (Article 49): and, Right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same 
criminal offence (Article 50). 
8 In Preamble to the Framework Decision, recital 8 
9 A Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing minimum 
standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime COM(2011) 275/2  
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2.3 Case Analyses 
It is important to look at the cases which the Court has ruled based upon the 
Framework Decision. The cases which are considered concern young children as the 
victims of crime; the definition of a victim as a natural or legal person; victims as a 
private prosecutor; and, victims of domestic abuse. These cases will show the import 
of fundamental rights in these cases, with a much smaller emphasis on fundamental 
freedoms.  
2.3.1 Young Children as Victims of Crime 
The case of Criminal Proceedings against Pupino10 is one which has attracted a great 
deal of academic comment as a result of its constitutional importance as to the legal 
effect of framework decisions which were adopted under what was previously the 
third pillar11. It has been the case that “Since the Pupino judgment, national courts of 
the Member States have the duty to interpret their legislation in conformity with 
instruments under the Third Pillar of the European Union.”12 and so granting indirect 
effect to matters pertinent to the Third Pillar13. 
 
The preliminary reference in this case came from Italy from the Tribunale di Firenze. 
The case concerned Signora Pupino, who was a nursery school teacher to children 
under the age of five. She was accused of, in several instances, a “misuse of 
disciplinary procedures” through a variety of actions including hitting the children 
regularly, preventing them from going to the toilet, threatening them and also closing 
their mouths with plasters. In light of these facts, the prosecutor asked that the judge 
who was in charge of the initial inquiries to take the statements from the children, 
who were both witnesses and victims, under a special procedure so as to protect their 
dignity and in order to avoid the children feeling distressed. The judge was also asked 
to note that there was the possibility of a “process of psychological repression“. 
                                                           
10 Case C-105/03 [2005] ECR I-5285 
11 M. Fletcher ‘Extending “indirect effect” to the third pillar: the significance of Pupino?’ 2005 
ELRev Vol.30(6) pp.862-877; Case Comment ‘ECJ affirms binding nature of JHA framework 
decisions’ 2005 EU Focus Vol.169 pp.9-10; N. Padfield & Katja Sugman ‘The Spread of EU Criminal 
Law’ 2006 Arch. News Vol. 7 pp.5-9; E. Spaventa ‘Opening Pandora’s box: some reflections on the 
constitutional effects of the decision in Pupino’ 2007 EuConst LR Vol.3(1) pp.5-24; R. Loof ‘Temporal 
aspects of the duty of consistent interpretation in the first and third pillars’ 2007 ELRev Vol.32(6) 
pp.888-895; V. Hatzopoulos ‘With or without you…judging politically in the field of Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ 2008 ELRev Vol.33(1), pp.44-65 
12 T. Margery ‘Case C-404/07, György Katz v István Roland Sós, Ruling of the Court (Third 
Chamber) of 9 October 2008, not yet reported’ 2009 CMLR Vol.46 pp.1697-1708 at p.1697 
13 M. Fletcher supra.n.11 at p.862 
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However, the special provisions which are in place in the Italian Code of Criminal 
Procedure Article 392(1a) referred only to those under the age of sixteen who have 
been subjected to some form of sexual offence or offence with a sexual background, 
which was not the situation with Ms Pupino and her pupils. Thus the defence opposed 
this application. The Italian Court also believed that the application should be 
rejected. However, in light of Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision which states 
that, “Each Member State shall ensure that victims who are particularly vulnerable 
can benefit from specific treatment best suited to their circumstances” and Article 8(4) 
which states “Each Member State shall ensure that, where there is a need to protect 
victims - particularly those most vulnerable - from the effects of giving evidence in 
open court, victims may, by decision taken by the court, be entitled to testify in a 
manner which will enable this objective to be achieved, by any appropriate means 
compatible with its basic legal principles.”, the Italian court made a preliminary 
reference to establish whether it was possible to interpret Italian law in the light of the 
Framework Decision.  
 
In the CJEU’s ruling, the Court followed the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott 
and ruled that Articles 2, 3 and 8(4) of the Framework Directive must give national 
courts the power to authorise young children who claim to be the victims of crime, to 
give their evidence in special procedures. The CJEU also ruled that national courts 
have to take into consideration the whole of national law and interpret them in light of 
the Framework Decision. 
 
There is a strong emphasis from both the Advocate General and the Court on issues of 
a fundamental rights/human rights nature in this case, a point referred to by one 
commentator: 
 
“In coming to this judgment, the European Court of Justice 
based much of its position on Judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights.”14 
 
Thus the Advocate General mentions the principle of legal certainty which is 
explicitly provided for in Article 7 of the ECHR, Article 15 of the International 
                                                           
14 M. Hall ‘The relationship between victims and prosecutors: defending victims’ rights?’ 2010 
Criminal Law Review Vol.1 pp.31-45 at p.37 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 49(1) of the Charter. 
However, with regard to this point the Advocate General argues that this case does 
not cover substantive law and as such the important principle is that of a fair trial15. 
The Advocate General returns to this point and states that the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial, enshrined both in Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter, must 
be respected16. She states that, “Under that provision, the defendant in criminal 
proceedings is entitled inter alia to a public hearing and to have the main witnesses 
heard and questioned at the hearing, with a view to adversarial argument. At the same 
time, the defendant must have the opportunity to question and challenge witnesses.”17 
Thus, in line with the ECtHR’s case law, she points out that the rights of the 
witnesses, who are victims, have to be balanced with that of the defendant. The 
Advocate General opined that in a case where there are particularly vulnerable 
children as witnesses then special procedures for taking evidence should apply. Thus 
the Advocate General is balancing the respective norms. 
 
The Court also made reference to fundamental rights and ECHR Article 618, and ruled 
that the Italian Court would have to allow the young children to have special 
procedures as long as Ms Pupino’s right to a fair trial was not encroached upon19. 
 
The need for the Court to consider the right to a fair trial in this instance is clear, 
particularly in light of the fact that the Italian provision makes no mention of special 
procedures in the circumstances in this case. However, the Court’s reasoning has 
generally been applauded,  
 
“…the Court is also likely to, and should, adopt a wide 
reading of harmonising legislation that sets out minimum 
standards of individuals’ rights. To a certain extent, we saw 
this in Pupino in relation to the rights of victims.”20 
 
The fact that the CJEU chose to use fundamental rights was initially considered 
                                                           
15 Case C-105/03 at paras 41-42 of the Opinion  
16 ibid at para 66 
17 ibid.at para 66 
18 Case C-105/03 paras 58-60 of the Ruling 
19 ibid.at para 61  
20 A. Hinarejos ‘Integration in criminal matters and the role of the Court of Justice’  2011 European 
Law Review Vol.36(3), pp.420-430 at p.428 
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surprising21, and in light of the Court’s reasoning being based upon fundamental 
rights and ECHR it has been stated that, “The EU, it said, must respect fundamental 
rights as guaranteed by the ECHR. So when construing Framework Decisions, and 
trying to interpret national laws to take account of them, courts must always bear in 
mind the ultimate need to respect the requirements of the ECHR - and in particular the 
right to a fair trial under Article 6.”22 
 
The Advocate General also makes reference to the fact that the witnesses/victims in 
this case are children and as such can be particularly vulnerable in line with the 
arguments from the Commission and the referring Italian Court23. She notes that 
children are provided for specifically in the Charter in Article 24 as well as in a range 
of other international instruments. Furthermore the Advocate General points out that, 
“Accordingly, Art.24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
guarantees the right of children to such protection and care as is necessary for their 
well-being. In all actions relating to children taken by public authorities the child’s 
best interests must be a primary consideration.”24  
 
It is interesting to note that in this case the Advocate General stated that the 
Framework Decision did not define who would or should be classified as a 
‘vulnerable’ victim, as there are a number of ways in which a person can be construed 
to be vulnerable25. With this in mind however, the Commission proposed a new 
directive on victims’ rights26 restating the right to protection of vulnerable victims27 
as well as a specific separate right to protection of child victims28. This underlines the 
importance of the fundamental rights of the child as well as the lasting impact of the 
Pupino ruling. It has been pointed out by one commentator that now practitioners 
                                                           
21 J.R.Spencer ‘Child witnesses and the European Union’ 2005 Cambridge Law Journal Vol.64(3) 
pp.569-572 at p.569 
22 ibid. at p.572 
23 Case C-105/03 at para 53 of the Opinion  
24 ibid. at para 57 
25 Case C-105/03 at paras 54-55 of the Opinion 
26 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing minimum 
standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime - COM(2011) 275/2 (Brussels) 
27 ibid. in Article 21. The wording of this Article has been criticised; see Joint Response of the 
Criminal Bar Association and Justice to the Consultation on European Directive on Victims Rights 
July 2011 
28 ibid. in Article 22 
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would have to find a way for smaller children to provide their evidence in advance of 
the trial29. Moreover, the question may be whether the Court would have been so 
willing to extend indirect effect to the Third Pillar had the case not concerned the 
particular class of victim that is children. This model of reasoning is one which 
Bengoetxea has suggested: 
“It may well be that if a proposed interpretation leads to 
consequences which are negatively evaluated by the 
interpreter, a different, more ‘suitable’ interpretation will be 
adopted…”30 
 
It is submitted that this is what the Court and the Advocate General did in this 
instance; it foreseen an undesirable situation where the most vulnerable in society 
would not be adequately protected when in the position of being a victim of crime. As 
such it must be remembered that “the ECJ can be considered a social agent; its 
decisions are socially relevant.”31 It has been elucidated by one commentator: 
 
“Where the European Union has recognised the existence of 
rights for suspected perpetrators or victims of criminal activity 
it is therefore crucial that these rights are enforceable.”32 
 
Thus this shows the importance that the Court has given to these rights and therefore 
created indirect effect of a part of the Treaty which was purely intergovernmental in 
nature. As such, this case was the pioneer in terms of firstly, demonstrating the 
indirect effect of Framework Decisions on the national legal orders and secondly, it 
was the first case on this specific Framework Decision on the standing of victims in 
criminal proceedings. It is clear from the lack of attention which the Court gave to 
fact that this was a ‘wholly internal situation’ that that had no effect on the Court’s 
capacity to rule on this area.  
 
Definition of Victims as Natural or Legal Persons  
 
There are two cases centred on similar issues and thus will be discussed together33. 
                                                           
29 J.R.Spencer supra.n.22 at p.571 
30 J.Bengoetxea ‘Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ 1993 OUP at p.96 Bengoetxea 
looks in depth at a number of factors which affect a Court’s reasoning. For more see p.115 
31 ibid. at p.98 
32 M. Fletcher supra.n.11 at p.875 
33 Criminal Proceeding against Giovanni Dell’Orto Case C-467/05 [2007] ECR I-5557; and Criminal 
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Firstly in the case of Criminal Proceedings against Dell’Orto, the preliminary 
reference came from the Tribunale di Milano, and surrounded the interpretation of the 
definition of victim as provided for in Article 1 of the Framework Decision as well as 
the Council Directive 2004/80 relating to compensation to crime victims34. There was 
some discussion of issues relating to whether the proceedings were admissible as a 
result of the reference being based on Article 234 EC as opposed to Article 35(1) EU, 
but the preliminary reference was found to be admissible35. Another issue of the 
temporal application of the law was discussed, but due to the procedural nature of the 
rule, it was decided to be in force for the purpose of the case36. Mr. Dell’Orto was 
found to have embezzled money from companies through receiving payment for 
fictional consultancy activities provided to offshore companies. Dell’Orto had given 
himself the amount of 1,064,069.78 euros which belonged to the company Saipem 
and was placed under sequestration of the Italian Court. After the final judgment, 
eventually Saipem obtained an order for the return of this money which was 
subsequently set aside. The Italian Courts questioned whether they were able to return 
this money to Saipem and felt this was based on a purely procedural point. Thus the 
Italian Court asked whether the Articles of the Framework Decision could apply to 
legal persons as well as natural persons and as such whether it could apply to legal 
persons for the purposes of the Directive relating to compensation to crime victims in 
the case.  
 
The ECJ firmly ruled in this case that: 
“It follows from the wording of this provision that the 
Framework Decision applies only to natural persons who have 
suffered harm directly caused by conduct which infringes the 
criminal law of a Member States. 
  
To interpret the Framework Decision to mean that it would 
also apply to “legal” persons…would contradict the very letter 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Proceedings against Emil Eredics and Mária Vassné Sápi Case C-205/09 
34 [2004] O.J. L261/15 
35 This was an issue which was discussed at length by the Advocate General in parts A and B of the 
Opinion. It is contended that the arguments were, at times, somewhat convoluted so as to allow the 
Court to hear this case. It was noted by the AG that “…references concerning Union law - under Art.35 
EU - are in principle requests within the meaning of Art.234 EC. The admissibility of a request cannot 
depend on the extent to which the national court refers expressly to those provisions.” The Court ruling 
also looked at the question of admissibility and held the reference to be admissible.  
36 Case C-467/05 at paras. 48 and 49 of the Ruling  
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of Art.1(a) of the Framework Decision.37” 
 
Thus the Court was quite clear on its position in this regard. The issue of the 
definition of a ‘victim’ arose again in a subsequent case. 
 
In the Eredics and Sápi case, Mr Eredics was the principal of a nursery school and Ms 
Sápi was the director of a hotel, both in Hungary. They entered into a framework 
contract for funding for a forest paths project which Mr Eredics was leading. Vá Ti 
kht, the Hungarian public utility company, supervised the project and settled the 
accounts. It became apparent that funding which was received as a result of invoices 
and log books drawn up were in fact fraudulent. As such, there were charges of 
adversely affecting the financial interests of the European Communities (EC) by 
allegedly having defrauded the Hungarian public utility company responsible for rural 
and urban development. Eredics admitted the facts against him and asked for 
mediation. Vá Ti kht agreed in its capacity as victim for mediation. The proceedings 
were thus stayed for mediation. However, the prosecutor appealed saying that the 
facts of the case did not lend itself to mediation under Hungarian law. Moreover it 
was argued that Eredics did not admit the facts during the investigation and also that 
Vá Ti kht was not in fact the real victim, but the EC (as it was at that time) was. Thus 
the case was referred onto the CJEU. 
 
This case followed on from Dell’Orto and the Court referred to it in its ruling. When 
analysing this case, the ECJ ruled that a ‘victim’ for the purposes of the Framework 
Decision does not extend to legal persons for mediation in criminal proceedings38. It 
is noted that the framework decision specifically refers to ‘natural persons’ in its 
definition in Article 1 and thus the Court cannot call into question the decision which 
the Court made in Dell‘Orto39. It was noted that, 
 
“The fact that some Member States provide for penal 
mediation where the victim is a legal person does not call into 
question that conclusion, the ECJ now held. Since the 
Framework Decision does not undertake a complete 
harmonisation of the field in question, a decision that its 
provisions are also applicable where the victim is a legal 
                                                           
37 Case C-467/05 at p.796 of the Ruling  
38 ibid. at para. 31 
39 ibid. at para.28  
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person is one that Member States are neither prevented by the 
Framework Decision nor obliged to take.”40 
 
The CJEU also ruled that Article 10 of the Framework Decision does not require 
Member States to make recourse to mediation for all substantive components. 
Member States can decide themselves and thus in this instance the Hungarian 
legislature did not go beyond its discretion41. 
 
Although it is important to note the fundamental rights aspects which have arisen in 
the case law, it is essential not to overstate the fundamental rights argument in these 
cases. Here are two examples which have arisen which have no fundamental rights 
reasoning whatsoever, and come largely down to a clear definition of the term 
‘victim’ as well as the admissibility of the preliminary reference. Thus these cases 
would suggest that although there may be times in which fundamental rights are the 
driving force in a ruling, there are instances where they play no role at all.  
 
On the other hand, there is still a lack of cross-border elements in these cases. 
Although there were some off-shore issues in the Dell’Orto case, the case was still 
about Italian nationals and an Italian Company, with the Italian Court forwarding the 
preliminary reference to the CJEU. Likewise with the Eredics and Sápi case, the 
defendants were both Hungarian and so was the public utility company who had 
overseen the accounts. It may be argued that as the victim could be seen as the EU 
then there was a cross-border element, but in reality, it is submitted that the EU was 
merely the overall administrator of the funding and the overall criminal acts were 
being undertaken within Hungary. Thus again, there is a lack of cross-border element 
suggesting that fundamental freedoms relating to movement has not needed to exist 
for the Court to intervene.  
 
Victims as a Private Prosecutor  
The circumstances which led to the case of György Katz v István Roland Sós42 being 
brought before the CJEU are quite distinct. In this case, the question boiled down to 
                                                           
40 Case Comment ‘Member States free to choose offences subject to mediation’ EU Focus 2010 pp.31 -
32 at p.31-32 
41 Case C-205/09 at para 38 of the Ruling 
42 Case C404/07 [2008] ECR I-7607 
 Word Count: 32474                                                                       39 of 102 
 
whether the Framework Decision requires that victims of crime must be able to be 
heard as witnesses in criminal proceedings in which they fulfil the role of prosecutor, 
in this case through the medium of the victim being a substitute private prosecutor. 
 
In this case Mr Katz had brought a substitute private prosecution against Mr Sós, who 
Mr Katz accused of defrauding him and thus as a result caused him serious harm. As a 
result of the fact that it was Mr Katz himself who was defrauded, he applied to be a 
witness in the case. However, this application was reject on the grounds that as public 
prosecutors may not act as witnesses in a case, thus neither should a substitute private 
prosecutor. The referring Hungarian Court asked, in paragraph 11 of the Court’s 
ruling: 
 
“Must Articles 2 and 3 of Council Framework Decision 
2001/220...be interpreted as meaning that the national court 
must be guaranteed the possibility of hearing the victim as a 
witness also in criminal proceedings which have been 
instituted by him as a substitute private prosecutor?”  
 
It should be noted that in the Framework Decision Article 2 provides that victims 
should have a real and appropriate role in criminal proceedings and Article 3 states 
that Member States shall safeguard the possibility of victims being allowed to provide 
their evidence in court and be heard. A number of issues were discussed in the Court, 
including the fact that there was nothing within the Framework Decision to suggest 
that victims who bring a substitute private prosecution should not be protected in their 
criminal proceedings43 and that in fact it is in such circumstances where a victim is 
bringing a prosecution that victims deserve special protection44. The Court discussed 
fundamental rights provisions45. However, the Court then ruled that in proceedings 
where the victim is also acting as a substitute for the prosecutor then they “must have 
the possibility of contributing evidence in the proceedings by giving testimony. Such 
victims need not, however, be afforded the status of witnesses if the applicable 
national law governing criminal procedure nevertheless grants them the possibility of 
being heard before the court and that testimony constitutes admissible evidence.”46  
                                                           
43 Case C-404/07 at para.38 of the Ruling 
44 ibid. at para.39  
45 Discussed further below 
46 Case C-404/07 at para.47 of the Ruling 
 Word Count: 32474                                                                       40 of 102 
 
 
This particular case provides an interesting juxtaposition of rights of victims as 
witnesses and the right to a fair trial. Comment on this case provides for a valuable 
summary of the Court’s overall judgment and highlights the complexity of the issue: 
 
“The ECJ therefore concluded that the Framework Decision 
while requiring Member States, first, to ensure that victims 
enjoyed a high level of protection and had a real and 
appropriate role in their legal system and, second, to recognise 
victims’ rights and legitimate interests and ensure they could 
be heard and supply evidence, left to the national authorities a 
wide margin of discretion with regard to the specific means by 
which they implemented those objectives. However, it also 
held …that the victim was to be able to give testimony in the 
course of criminal proceedings which could be taken into 
account as evidence.”47 
 
The Court noted the rather awkward position which prevailed: on the one hand 
allowing the victims to be witnesses in cases where they are also the prosecutor could 
lead to a conflict of interest48; on the other hand, the victim’s evidence could also be 
essential in proving the case against the accused.49 Advocate General Kokott alluded 
to this fact, it being noted that, “Indeed, where the public prosecutor refused to carry 
on prosecution, the victim has to supply all the evidence on his/her own - his/her 
testimony being one of the most important - in order to prove the charge. However, 
the Advocate General did not accept the contention of Mr Katz that this would 
amount to a breach of his right to a fair trial. The protection against unfair trial as 
enshrined in Article 6 ECHR in criminal cases remains mainly in favour of the 
defendant.”50 Thus the right to a fair trial is an interesting line of argument for the 
Court to follow in any case regarding the Framework Decision on the standing of 
victims in criminal proceedings because it is most likely that whatever rights that 
victim does have, and no matter how strongly the Court attempts to safeguard them, 
there is always the chance that their rights can be lessened to ensure the overall 
fairness of the trial as required by Article 6 ECHR. In this regard one commentator 
has contended that, “In the fight against crime, public prosecutors must uphold 
                                                           
47 Case Comment ‘Victim acting as prosecutor must be able to give evidence’ 2008 EU Focus Vol.243 
pp.12-13 at p.13 
48 Case C-404/07 at para.44 of the Ruling 
49 ibid  at para.32  
50 T. Margery supra. at n.13 at p.1701 
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fundamental human rights and, therefore, always try to find the right balance between 
the prosecution of these rights and the public interest.”51 Therefore, the problems 
inherent in this type of case are clear from the outset.   
 
Not only was the victim’s role an odd one, it led to the important issue of the 
recognition of fundamental rights, similar to that in the Pupino case above. The Court 
stated that “It should, in addition, be emphasised that giving effect to the position of 
victims bringing prosecutions should not entail any kind of diminution of the rights of 
the defence…The rights of defence, therefore, constitute a fundamental right forming 
part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures” The Court 
then went on to refer to ECHR Article 6, right to a fair trial and Articles 47 and 48 of 
the Charter, and say that the Framework Decision had to be read in light of these 
provisions. Particular mention was made in the ruling of the defence’s right to 
examine or to have examined witnesses against him, a point which the Advocate 
General also made. The CJEU also noted that it was for the national court to ensure 
that the position of the defence was not prejudiced in light of allowing the 
victim/witness/substitute private prosecutor from providing testimony52.   
 
The importance of the equality of arms is stressed in this ruling53. Although it is 
important in these types of cases for the Framework Decision to protect a particular 
type of victim, nevertheless, the rights of the defence, which are enshrined elsewhere, 
are not to be prejudiced as a consequence.  
 
An analysis of this case provides an illuminating illustration of the interaction 
between the CJEU and the ECtHR: 
 
“…the ECJ, on the one hand, respects the diversity of national 
legal systems, but, on the other hand confirms that human 
rights protection as enshrined in the ECHR and interpreted by 
the Court of Strasbourg requires unity. The judgment confirms 
that, far from operating in isolation from each other, the Court 
in Luxembourg operates in line with the Court in Strasbourg.” 
                                                           
51 T. Margery supra. at n.13 at p.1707 
52 Case C-404/07 at para.45-46 of the Ruling 
53 ibid. at para.45 
 Word Count: 32474                                                                       42 of 102 
 
54  
 
 
This, it is submitted, makes it difficult to argue that the Court is not taking a broader 
approach when dealing with fundamental rights and a more restricted approach in 
respect of fundamental freedoms. This entire case was based within Hungary and 
again no cross-border element is visible. 
 
Victims of Domestic Violence   
This case concerned Criminal Proceedings against Gueye (X intervening) and 
Salmerón Sánchez (Y intervening)55 in respect of domestic violence. The position of 
victims of domestic violence is particularly sensitive as the victims are particularly 
vulnerable. Interestingly a consultation paper has been published in the UK and aimed 
to “prevent domestic violence occurring or recurring; to increase support for victims; 
and to ensure improved legal protection and justice for domestic violence victims.”56 
The consultation paper was published prior to implementation of the Framework 
Decision and underlines problems which victims of domestic abuse face.  
 
The preliminary reference in the Gueye and Sanchez cases were referred from the 
Audiencia Provincial de Tarragona in Spain. The central issue was whether the 
Framework Decision prevented reliance on the Spanish national law which created a 
mandatory penalty where the perpetrator of the crime had to stop any kind of contact 
with the victim, regardless of whether the victim would like to have further contact 
with the perpetrator. This was as a result of Articles 57(2) and 48(2) of the Spanish 
Criminal Code which provided that an additional penalty be imposed upon the 
offender which prevents the offender from contacting the victim. This is supposed to 
provide protection to the victim according to the referring court57. Additionally, a 
breach of this injunction resulted in the crime of contempt of court as stated in 
Art.468(2) of the Spanish Criminal Code.  
                                                           
54 T. Margery  supra.n.13 at p.1708 
55 Joined Cases C-483/09 & C-1/10 
56 Home Office, Safety and Justice: The Government’s Proposals on Domestic Violence (Home Office, 
London, 2003) as cited in L. Ellison “Responding to victim withdrawal in domestic violence 
prosecutions” 2003 Criminal Law Review  November pp.760-772 at p.760 
57 Joined Cases C-483/09 & C-1/10 ibid. at para.7 of the Opinion 
 Word Count: 32474                                                                       43 of 102 
 
 
In this case Mr Gueye and Mr Salmerón Sánchez, were both held separately in 
contempt of court after, primarily being found guilty of domestic violence towards 
their partners and then breaching the ancillary order to stay away from the victims 
within a very short period of time in both instances. Mr Gueye was prohibited from 
being within 1000 metres of his victim and Mr Salmerón Sánchez within 500 metres 
of his victim for periods of 17 and 16 months respectively.58 Such a penalty was 
imposed on both the offenders regardless of the views of the victims, who wanted to 
resume contact with the offenders.  
 
The Court noted in this case that even though the victim’s interests are to be taken 
into consideration, an injunction can still be imposed contrary to their wishes59. The 
CJEU also noted that such a penalty against the offender “is not only to protect the 
interests of the victim as he or she perceives them but also other more general 
interests of society.”60 It was thus ruled in this case that such an injunction against the 
perpetrator was not precluded by the Framework Decision where the victim disagrees 
with the penalty61.  
 
On an issue which arose in the Eredics and Sápi cases regarding mediation, the Court 
also ruled that crimes within the family could be excluded from the possibility of 
mediation62. This emphasises the idea that the Member States have a large measure of 
discretion in how they implement Framework Decisions.  
 
This case is a particularly interesting one, and the Court’s ruling and the Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott is equally so. The Advocate General notes that the Charter 
has to be given due consideration63. The specific provision of Article 7 of the Charter, 
which provides for the respect for private and family life, was put forward as an 
argument by the Commission. The Commission submitted that due to the fact there 
was no discretion in the Spanish law in respect of the measures to be taken, then the 
                                                           
58 Joined Cases C-483/09 & C-1/10 at para.19 of the Ruling 
59 ibid. at para.56  
60 ibid. at para.61  
61 ibid. at para.70  
62 ibid. at para.76  
63 Joined Cases C-483/09 & C-1/10 at para.76 of the Opinion  
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victim’s private and family life would be disrupted.  
 
However, it was stated by the Advocate General that in this instance the Framework 
Decision did not affect the suitability of the penalties which are to be imposed. The 
Advocate General went further and stated that the Court which had jurisdiction on the 
matter of whether an injunction to keep the victim away from the perpetrator was in 
line with fundamental rights was either the national court or the ECtHR. This is an 
interesting position that the Advocate General decided to take. This may be with 
regard to the specific questions which were raised in the preliminary ruling; that is to 
say that perhaps if the question was formulated in a different way then it would have 
had due regard to issues of private and family life. On the other hand, it was perhaps a 
very deliberate move to steer clear of issues which may be seen to constitute issues 
over which the ECtHR has jurisdiction over and to avoid having to comment on the 
Charter‘s binding status.  
 
With regard to the Court’s ruling, it did not arrive at the same conclusion. The Court 
stated that, “The provisions of the Framework Decision must be interpreted in such a 
way that fundamental rights, including in particular the right to respect for family and 
private life, as stated in art.7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, are respected.”64 Thus it was noted that the victim had a right to be heard and 
consideration should be taken of their opinion65. However, in stating that, the Court 
explained that it did not in turn mean that the victim had rights in terms of the 
penalties to be imposed. It is submitted that this is the correct ruling; to provide the 
victim with the right to be able to suggest some kind of imposition of a penalty is an 
unusual one. Obviously this case alludes to the situation where the victims would 
have opted for a lesser (if not no) penalty on the perpetrator of the crime. But what of 
the situation where a person has suffered at the hands of another and feels they 
deserve a life in prison? In such a case it would hardly seem fair that the view of the 
victim has any kind of binding effect. Such an opinion may be taken into 
consideration but should not replace the role of the judge. This point is reaffirmed by 
one commentator who notes: 
 
                                                           
64 Joined Cases C-483/09 & C-1/10 at para.55 of the Ruling  
65 Joined Cases C-483/09 & C-1/10 at paras.57-59  
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“The measures and the associated case law and statutory 
instruments make it clear that victims should not expect to 
dictate prosecution decisions or, in all circumstances, have 
their wishes adhered to during the criminal process…A good 
example of this reality lies in the particular problems faced by 
the criminal justice system when approaching cases of 
domestic violence.”66  
 
Thus the comment provides some clarity on this issue within the Framework 
Decision.  
 
Furthermore, it has been observed that: 
 
“Nevertheless, there will inevitably be cases, albeit a minority, 
where, inter alia, the severity of harm inflicted and the 
likelihood of recurrence render it in the public interest to 
prosecute a perpetrator of domestic violence regardless of the 
alleged victim’s non-co-operation.67”  
 
This is perhaps the converse, i.e., where the situation is that regardless of the fact the 
victims wants to be reunited with the partner, it is perhaps both in the victim’s interest 
and in the public interest, to keep the victim away from their partner regardless of 
their wishes. The Court’s position in the case is specific to the case that of a victim of 
domestic violence. It can often be difficult to discern whether pressure has been 
exerted upon the victim and CJEU’s decision not to preclude this legislation, 
particularly in a Member State struggling with the issue of domestic abuse, is perhaps 
understandable.  
 
It cannot be ignored however that there will be effects on the victims’ family life, and 
the Court, although mentioning the Charter and its provision, fails to make any 
meaningful comment in the context of the case. The victims wished one outcome but 
faced with a very different one. To the benefit of those said victims - perhaps, but to 
decide what is best for these victims is not the role of the CJEU.  
 
This is another case which deals only with Spanish litigants, Spanish legislation and 
has been a reference from a Spanish Court. There is no cross-border element in this 
case.   
                                                           
66 M. Hall supra.n.15 at p.40  
67 L. Ellison supra. n.57 at p.762 
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2.4 Fundamental Rights Reasoning of the CJEU  
Notably victims’ rights are not rights which are protected by the ECHR but the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial is one which is protected by the Convention. 
Nonetheless, the CJEU has now chosen to look at issues of fundamental rights as 
enshrined in the Charter and human rights as enshrined in the ECHR, particularly in 
relation to the right to a fair trial. However, it is contended that there is still some 
criticism to be leveled at the CJEU in this regard. At times within the rulings it seems 
more like the CJEU is merely paying lip service to fundamental rights, particularly in 
the Gueye and Sánchez cases. The issue of the victim’s right to a private and family 
life was largely ignored.  
 
Moreover, these issues are often mentioned near the end of the ruling, as though an 
afterthought. This must be seen as surprisingly in light of the issues which are being 
handled, and particularly due to the strong connection with State sovereignty that 
these issues raise. It is submitted that this is as a result of fundamental rights falling 
within the category of general principles of law68, which is why, at times, there fails to 
be a proper analysis of such issues. 
 
However, Courts and Advocates General have begun to pave the way by increasingly 
considering these issues, and it must not be forgotten that the binding effect of the 
Charter is still relatively new in the overall development of the EU’s legal order. 
Many basic points regarding the ECtHR have been explained, including the fact that, 
“The court [European Court of Human Rights] has consistently made it clear that the 
relevant consideration is whether the proceedings taken as a whole were fair.”69 It is 
submitted that the Court made slightly stronger opinions felt with regard to the 
provisions regarding the right to a fair trial.  
 
Although the Zambrano case70 relates to citizenship, some points which Advocate 
General Sharpston made with regard to fundamental rights provide interesting 
                                                           
68 G.Conway ‘Levels of Generality in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ 2008 
European Law Journal (ELJ) Vol.14(6) pp.787-805 at p.793 Other issues such as legal certainty and 
proportionality are also referred to. 
69 L. Ellison supra. n.57 at p.771  
70 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] 2 CMLR 46 
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reflection. She noted that, “The rule would be that, provided that the EU had 
competence (whether exclusive or shared) in a particular area of law, EU fundamental 
rights should protect citizens of the EU even if such competence has not yet been 
exercised.”71 Thus the fact that fundamental rights arguments are being furthered in 
relation to the area of freedom, security and justice, a field of shared competence 
between the EU and the Member States, is no great surprise, particularly bearing in 
mind the content of such cases.  
 
Moreover, the position of fundamental rights in these cases should not be over stated. 
Perhaps as a growing field in law, the few case studies undertaken in this chapter are 
more examples of questions over definitions as opposed to fundamental rights. Thus 
new cases on the Framework Decision (or any future directive based upon this 
provision) should be closely monitored to determine whether any further pattern 
emerges. 
 
2.5 Lack of Cross-border Element 
One of the comments that have been made in relation to this Framework Decision 
was: 
“…the Decision focuses on cross-border victims, that is, 
persons who fall victim to crime in a country other than their 
country of residence. In fact, tourists and travellers in other 
member states have a higher risk of becoming victims of 
crime than the residents of that country…”72 
 
While perhaps it can be argued that this is one of the aims of the Framework 
Decision, that is, to protect those victims of crime from abroad (and thus pertaining to 
the idea of free movement), it is difficult to see evidence of this restriction in the case 
law so far. As yet not a single case which has been referred to the Court has centred 
on the issue of one Member State’s national being a victim of crime in another 
Member State. While it could be argued that this merely means that the Framework 
                                                           
71 Case C-34/09 at para.163 of the Opinion 
72 S. Kuhn ‘Falling victim to inadequate laws’ 2005 European Lawyer Vol.46 pp.31-32 
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Decision has been implemented correctly and is achieving all its intended outcomes, it 
is contended that this would be a rather naïve and simplistic position to take. The fact 
remains that CJEU has had opportunities to answer questions from Member States 
where a wholly internal situation has been at issue. Notably however, the Commission 
reported73 that implementation of the Framework Decision as a whole has been 
unsatisfactory. Perhaps, as a result, the CJEU recognises the need to provide adequate 
protection to nationals of a Member State where they are not being adequately 
protected as a result of a lack of (or poorer quality) piece of national legislation 
supposedly implementing the Framework Decision.  
 
The reason for having a rule regarding the requirement of cross-border movement is 
explained by one commentator: 
 
“The current ‘internal situation rule’ does not exist just for the 
sake of it. The rule reflects constitutional values that the Court 
must respect and also protect…it serves as the borderline 
demarcating the EU’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis national 
jurisdictions and expresses the ‘federal’ notion that there are 
matters that the EU, in principle, should not get involved in. 
Hence crossing that borderline is by definition a politically 
sensitive and a constitutionally troublesome thing to so. 
Caution is warranted.”74 
 
It is not contended that the Court is opposed to such rulings in this particular field; 
rather it is submitted that the lack of cross-border element in the case law discussed 
above strengthens and supports the proposition that the Court is not relying in its 
reasoning on the fundamental freedoms which have existed in the EU since its 
inception but on the protection of fundamental rights which in fact means the Court 
                                                           
73 Commission Report on the basis of Article 18 of the Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 
on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings (2001/220/JHA) 
74 A. Pieter van der Mei ‘The Outer Limits of the Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
Nationality: A Look Through the Lens of Union Citizenship’  2011 MJ pp.62-85 Vol.18 at p.78 
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has widened its competences.  
 
This can be seen from the development and reasoning regarding ‘purely internal 
situations’. Initially the Court was reluctant to rule on wholly internal situations. The 
Saunders case75 is an example of this. This was the first case to apply the ‘wholly 
internal situation’ rule since it concerned a woman from Northern Ireland who was 
working in England and convicted of theft. The English courts decreed that she had to 
remain in Northern Ireland for a period of three years, which, she argued was 
incompatible with her right to free movement as guaranteed by EU law. The CJEU 
however, would not rule on this as it concerned a wholly internal situation. It has been 
pointed out that “When the Saunders case was decided, the idea of the common 
market having anything to do with a Member State’s exercise of its power in the field 
of criminal law with reference to its own nationals would no doubt have been 
shocking”76. However, today the EU does have competences in the AFSJ.  
 
It might be worthwhile mentioning at this juncture that perhaps the Court’s most 
recent reasoning was in response to a perceived heightened level of cross-border 
crime as a result of the removal of the internal borders between Member States. Again 
this initial reasoning has a cross-border emphasis which the Court does not seem to 
take into account.  
 
In light, however, of the surprising situation of ‘reverse discrimination’ which can 
occur, it is understandable why the Court would wish to avoid this in light of cases 
                                                           
75 Case 178/78 [1979] ECR 1129  
76 S. O’Leary ‘The past, present and future of the purely internal rule in EU law’ 2009 Irish Jurist 
Vol.44, pp.13-46 at p.33 
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involving fundamental rights of citizens. This phenomenon is described here: 
“Reverse discrimination has remained a problem for the EU 
since the 1970s. Arising across all fundamental freedoms, it is 
a direct corollary of EU law’s non-application in ‘wholly 
internal’ situations. Such discrimination is premised not on 
discrimination against nationals, but rather, on discrimination 
against individuals who have not made use of free movement 
rights. The result is that Member State national, as a rule, may 
be treated less favourably than foreign nationals.”77 
 
Thus if we take the Pupino example, would the children had to have come from 
another Member State and exercised their free movement rights, then suffered the 
abuse at the hands of the teacher, before a preliminary reference could be made to the 
CJEU? It is clear that this would have left an unimaginable and highly unsatisfactory 
situation.  
 
Thus, although the background to the AFSJ and this specific Framework Decision had 
cross-border origins, the issues which are raised in these cases are ones upon which 
the Court is asked to consider. It is submitted that this is most likely because there is a 
greater emphasis on fundamental rights in this area. The Framework Decision has 
certain specific articles based upon the cross-border element but otherwise there is no 
suggestion that the Court cannot look to wholly internal situations. Equally though, it 
is not clear that there is a legal base in the Treaties which permits the Court ruling in 
such areas. It does however present an interesting example of the changed role that 
the CJEU perceives it has in this field of law.  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
It was once commented that “The ECJ is driven by the same concern to uphold the 
protection of fundamental rights in the context of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice as far as police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters is concerned.”78 It 
is argued that, the Court has largely the ‘same concern to uphold the protection of 
fundamental rights’ within the more discrete ambit of the Framework Decision on the 
Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings within PJCC. The fundamental and 
                                                           
77 R. Morris ‘Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), Ruling of 
the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 March 2011, not yet reported’ 2011 MJ Vol.18 pp.179-189 at pp.185-
186 
78 K. Lenaerts “The Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the area of freedom, security and 
justice” 2010 ICLQ Vol.59(2) pp.255-301 at p.298 
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human rights arguments which have been put forward by the Court have been 
analysed above. It is contended that there has been a shift towards resolving the issues 
raised in the case law by focusing on the Charter and the ECHR. However that being 
said, it is concluded that the Court could continue to go further, en route to being seen 
as taking fundamental rights more seriously. 
 
On the other hand, the lack of cross-border element, which has to be seen to relate to 
the lack of economic elements within the facts of the cases, has been totally absent. 
Interestingly, the Court has dealt in ‘wholly internal situations’ and has rendered 
much of the original language and reasoning on fundamental freedoms redundant in 
this area. Thus there is a much lesser emphasis on the fundamental freedoms and it is 
difficult to find any reference to citizenship, free movement or the like within the 
rulings on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings.  
 
Thus to conclude, it would seem that there has been a greater emphasis placed on 
fundamental rights which could be seen as conversely proportionate to the level of 
emphasis placed upon the fundamental freedoms. Whether this is the situation which 
is evident throughout the field of PJCC remains to be seen. The next chapter will 
focus on whether the same is evident in the case law on the European Arrest Warrant.   
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Chapter 3 - The Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
European Arrest Warrant  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter’s aim is to assess the position the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has taken with regard to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)1, fundamental 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
  
This will be undertaken, primarily, by providing an explanation of the EAW and will 
then analyse the case law which has arisen in this somewhat controversial field of 
European Union (EU) law. The strength of fundamental rights arguments will be 
underlined. However, the very essence of the EAW is the requirement of movement 
which will provide a noteworthy contrast to the case law on the framework decision 
on victims’ rights. A parallel will also be drawn with some select Schengen cases 
which provide illustrative examples of perhaps not competing fundamental rights and 
freedoms, but in fact competing fundamental rights alone.  
3.2 Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the 
Surrender Procedures between the Member States 
The Council Framework Decision on the EAW was considered to be one of the steps 
“to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice.”2 The 
question therefore remains, what actually is the EAW? The EAW was the EU 
successor to various extradition Treaties amongst the Member States which were 
based on public international law. In a case where a person is not in the State where 
that person is awaiting a criminal trial, and an extradition Treaty was in place with the 
State the person is in, then the State in which the person was present would extradite 
that person to the issuing State. This would equally be the case for a person after they 
have been sentenced and have to undertake that sentence. Thus the EU created the 
EAW to simplify the former extradition process which had come to be known as 
somewhat “ineffective.”3 It has been noted that: 
 “Responding to the shortcomings in current practice, the 
                                                           
1  Council Framework Decision 2002/584 (JHA) on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, hereinafter referred t o as EAW or the European Arrest Warrant   
2  Article 2 TEU  
3  S.Alegre and M.Leaf ‘European Arrest Warrant: A solution ahead of its time?’ A Justice Publication 
2003 at p.8  
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EAW is intended to introduce faster and simpler surrender 
procedures, primarily through reliance on the principle of 
mutual recognition and through ensuring the process takes 
place exclusively between the judicial rather than the political 
authorities of EU member states, while continuing to 
safeguard human rights…”4  
 
In the development of the EAW Framework Decision, many amendments were put 
forward to the original proposal by the Commission and the European Parliament 
which evinced that “the members of these organs were preoccupied with the 
protection of human rights and safeguarding fundamental freedoms in the new 
mechanism.”5 It is thus clear that at the very essence of the EAW is free movement. 
Equally, however, the importance of human rights protection is of prime importance, 
especially in terms of the right to a fair trial.  
 
Interestingly, the EAW was the “first European instrument to implement the principle 
of mutual recognition. It is based on mutual trust and understanding of each other’s 
legal systems and enforcement mechanisms.”6 However, the extent to which Member 
States actually have mutual trust in each other’s legal systems is debatable7, as is the 
use of a principle which has its roots in the establishment of a free internal market8. 
Moreover, an important point has been made namely the idea that the Member States 
should blindly trust that other Member States are adhering to fundamental rights just 
because they are signatories to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) is 
somewhat surprising in light of the fact that the Member States are often brought to 
task before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) specifically for human 
rights abuses9. It is in light of such issues that the EAW is particularly controversial 
and has led to references to the CJEU.  
 
                                                           
4  S.Alegre and M.Leaf supra. n.3 at p.9 
5 M.Plachta and W. van Allegoric ‘The Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and 
Surrender Procedures Between Member States of the European Union’ in R. Blextoon and W. van 
Allegoric ‘Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant’ 2005  TMC Asser Press distributed by 
Cambridge University Press at p.35  
6 A. Vitorino in R. Blextoon and W. van Allegoric ibid. at p.1  
7 In fact it has been suggested that it actually creates ‘mistrust’: “it can provoke in the analyst a certain 
mistrust towards the legal orders of the other States…” M. de Hoyos Sancho Harmonization of 
Criminal Proceedings, Mutual Recognition and Essential Safeguards’ in de Hoyos Sancho, M (Ed) 
‘Criminal proceedings in the European Union: essential safeguards’ (Lex Nova, 2008) at p.44 
8 K.Ambos ‘Mutual recognition versus procedural guarantees?’ in de Hoyos Sancho, M (Ed) ibid. at 
p.30 It is noted that rather than the free movement of goods being at stake, it is in fact personal freedom 
of EU citizens.  
9 Examples are provided for in M. de Hoyos Sancho supra. at n.7 at p.75-76 
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3.3 Case Analyses 
The EAW has been problematic for the Member States with the result that many 
national cases were appealed to the national Constitutional Courts to rule on the 
constitutionality of the Framework Decision10. Problems with the new Framework 
Decision involved the abolition of the exception to extradite a Member State’s own 
nationals and the removal of the double criminality requirement, i.e. the removal (in 
most cases) for the offence to be a crime in both the issuing and executing States. 
These are some of the issues which concern the following case law which has came 
before the CJEU.  
Validity of the EAW  
This case of Advocaten Voor De Wereld VZW v Leden Van De Ministerraad11 arose 
from the Belgian Constitutional Court after other Constitutional Courts had avoided 
making a preliminary reference to the CJEU. The case was based upon the validity of 
the Framework Decision on the EAW. Advocate General Ruiz Jarabo Colomer 
pointed out that the questions being asked by the Arbitragehof  comprised of one 
procedural issue and one substantive issue.12 The questions being referred by the 
Belgian Constitutional Court were firstly whether a Framework Decision was the 
appropriate form of implementation under Article 34(2)(b) TEU rather than a 
convention in light of the fact that Framework decisions ought only to be adopted “for 
the purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States”. 
Secondly it was asked whether Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision, regarding the 
abolition of the requirement of double criminality regarding certain offences, was 
compatible with Article 6(2) TEU and specifically compatible with the principle of 
legality of criminal proceedings as well as the principles of equality and non-
discrimination.  
 
The length of the Court’s actual ruling has been criticised for its surprising brevity: 
only sixty two paragraphs in total with twenty dedicated to the procedural issue and a 
                                                           
10 See Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court), Decision of 18 July 2005 (2 BvR 
2236/04);  Trybunal Konstytucyjny (Polish Constitutional Court), Ruling of 27 April 2005, No. P1/05; 
Ruling of the Czech Constitutional Court of 3 May 2006, PI US 66/04; Supreme Court of Cyprus. 
Ruling of 7 November 2005, App No 294/2005; Minister for Justice & Law Reform v Robert Aaron 
Anderson [2006] IEHC 95 and Office of the King’s Prosecutor v Cando Armas [2005] UKHL 67. 
11 Case C-303/05 [2007] 3 CMLR 1 
12 ibid. at para.3 of the Opinion  
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mere eighteen to the substantive issue13. The Court decided that a framework decision 
was the appropriate form of implementation of the EAW as opposed to a convention 
and that the Framework Decision was compatible with Article 6(2) and the principles 
of legality, equality and non-discrimination.   
 
In terms of the procedural issue, the Court considered the argument that the 
Framework Decision should in fact have been made through the use of a convention 
instead. It was argued that if a measure is implemented through a convention on 
extradition, then only another convention can validly introduce further 
derogatations14. However this idea concerning the actus contrarius doctrine was 
rejected by both the Advocate General15 and the Court. The Court stated that to come 
to any other conclusion would “risk depriving if its essential effectiveness the 
Council’s recognised power to adopt framework decisions in fields previously 
governed by international conventions.”16 As such the Council could use whatever 
means it felt was most suitable for the EAW, and while that could have been in the 
form of a convention, there was no reason why it could not be a framework decision.  
 
On the other hand, when it came to the substantive question, the Court provided some 
intriguing responses. The plaintiffs put forward the argument firstly based on the fact 
that Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision, which removed the requirement for 
double criminality in thirty two non-defined offences, did not adhere to the principle 
of legal certainty. It was suggested that the lack of precise legal definitions meant that 
it did not satisfy the conditions of precision, clarity and predictability which requires a 
person to know whether what they have done constitutes an offence at the time of the 
act.17 However, the Court did not agree with such a position. The Court concluded 
that although the legality of criminal offences is of great importance and is common 
to the constitutional traditions of the Member States and enshrined in international 
instruments, it was down to the issuing States’ definition of the offence. The 
harmonisation of criminal offences was not one of the aims of the EAW or of the 
                                                           
13 F.Geyer  ‘European arrest warrant: Court of Justice of the European Communities: Ruling of 3rd 
May 2007, case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad Case 
Comment’ 2008 Eu. Const. LR Vol.4(1) pp.149-161 at p.153 
14 Case C-303/05 at paras 11,25  and 26 of the Ruling 
15 Case C-303/05 at paras.38-68 of the Opinion 
16 Case C-303/05 at para.42 of the Ruling  
17 ibid. at para.48 
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Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC).18   
 
Turning to the issue of equality and non-discrimination regarding double criminality 
that the plaintiffs put forward, it was contended that for offences which are not 
covered by Article 2(2) then the double criminality rule will apply and as such there is 
a difference in treatment which is not objectively justified.19 These principles, which 
the Court explains, mean that “comparable situations must not be treated differently 
and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment 
is objectively justified.”20 An issue which the Court looked to in order to assist with 
their reasoning was that of mutual trust and recognition. Thus the decision that the 
Court reached was that regardless of whether it was a comparable situation between a 
person who had committed an offence specified in Article 2(2) or not, it would be 
objectively justified that they were treated differently21.   
 
This case has been scrutinised as a result of the significance which it carries in the 
(former) Third Pillar and also due to the case being the first one on matters relating to 
the EAW. The case has even been described as “seminal” by Lenaerts22.  
 
As far as the substantive issues in the case are concerned, the Court when examining 
the issue of legality, on the basis of competition law and the principle of legality of 
criminal offences and penalties (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) as this 
principle is one of the (commonly referred to) general legal principles underlying the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and  was enshrined in various 
international treaties.23 As such it was for the Member States to enforce legality as the 
EAW is seen to be an essentially procedural prosecution and not criminal prosecution, 
an issue with which commentators have major issues24. It is contended that the Court 
often makes reference to certain principles, for instance, those enshrined in Article 6 
of the ECHR and now those enshrined in the Charter. However, the Court makes 
sweeping statements without an in-depth analysis of the effects that such principles 
                                                           
18 ibid. at paras.48-54    
19 ibid. at para.55  
20 ibid. at para.56  
21 ibid. at para.57-58  
22 K.Lenaerts “The contribution of the European Court of Justice to the area of freedom, security and 
justice’  2010 ICLQ Vol.59(2) pp.255-301 at p.298 
23 Case 303/05 at paras 48-54 of the Ruling 
24 F.Geyer supra. n.13 at p.159 
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have on the case at hand. This, it is argued, is the situation in Advocaten voor de 
Wereld; mention is made to these principles which are actually at the heart of the 
arguments and yet quite a brief examination ensues25.  
 
This theme is continued in reference to the issues of equality and non-discrimination. 
This part of the ruling has been particularly criticised26. Criticisms levelled at this part 
of the ruling are based on the fact that no particular in depth analysis was given on the 
issue of whether there was a comparable situation between those offences which do 
and do not require double criminality. Moreover, it was suggested that the issue was 
in fact one of proportionality as opposed to that of using the seriousness of the offence 
as an objective justification27. Thus it seems that the Court used brevity somewhat as 
an avoidance technique to prevent further scrutiny which may have led to an 
unsatisfactory answer. As put by one commentator, “It should be borne in mind that 
arguing that disparities in the application of Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision 
breach the principle of equality attacks the very principle behind this EU measure, ie, 
that of mutual recognition”28 There has also been suggestion that there certainly are 
inequalities which could exist as a result of using Member State definitions. These 
national definitions could lead to two different people committing the same crime and 
fleeing to different countries with the result being a difference of treatment29. 
 
Moreover, the wider significance of this judgment has been noted as well: 
 
“If the Court had declared the very first legal instrument 
incorporating the principle of mutual recognition as 
incompatible with fundamental rights, it would have sent a 
devastating signal to proponents of further EU judicial co-
operation based on this principle, but the Court rejected the 
plaintiff’s challenge and upheld the Framework Decision.”30  
 
Thus, the ruling made by the Court in this case, and its relative brevity, was perhaps 
attributable to a fear of what would result for the area of freedom, security and justice 
                                                           
25 This point was also made in reference to Chapter 2; see p.42 
26 F.Geyer supra n.13 at p.160-161 
27 ibid.  
28 A.Hinarejos ‘Recent human rights developments in the EU courts: the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, the European arrest warrant and terror lists’ 2007 HRLRev Vol7(4) pp.793-811 at p.799 
29 A.Hinarejos supra.n.28 The example used by the author is a particularly useful and interesting one 
which evidences the potentially bizarre consequence of mutual recognition instead of harmonisation of 
national criminal laws  
30 F.Geyer supra. n.13 at p.151 
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(AFSJ) had their landmark instrument been struck down. The lack of detail on certain 
points in the Court’s ruling could likely be part of a strategy to expedite the 
preliminary reference quickly. It has been pointed out though, that this may have left 
some unsatisfactory gaps from the Court.31  
 
It is submitted that the EAW provides a particularly interesting example of the 
interests which are being balanced between fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and Advocaten voor de Wereld is a useful illustrative example for this 
point. On the one hand, the AFSJ is based on the fact that citizens can move freely 
between Member States and the consequences can be twofold. Firstly there is a higher 
chance of cross-border crime as a result of fewer barriers between borders, and 
secondly, there is a requirement therefore to ensure a high level of safety and 
protection to those within the EU. Understandably then, this would involve a 
streamlined process within the ‘trusting’ EU Member States to bring criminals to 
justice within it, and thus the tool of the EAW is being used to do so. However, even 
though our fundamental rights and freedoms are being protected by being able to live 
in a ‘safe space’, the question is whether competing fundamental rights are being paid 
adequate attention. Illustrated in this case, we see an unsatisfactory analysis of the 
principles of legal certainty, equality and non-discrimination, while on the other hand 
seeing further deference to what was at that time, the non-binding legal document of 
the Charter. Therefore this case is demonstrative of the issues which the Court has to 
attempt to balance: on the one hand, the fundamental rights of people to move freely 
and safely around the Union without the fear of criminal activity whilst on the other 
hand providing adequate and equal protection to those who may or may not have done 
wrong - all in the midst of principles of ‘mutual trust’ and ‘mutual recognition’ which 
supposedly exists within the Member States. Meanwhile in practice a certain element 
of reluctance amongst the Member States to adhere to such principles can make this 
difficult. As the Advocate General put it: 
“while the protection of fundamental rights is an essential part 
of the Community Pillar, it is equally indispensable in the 
context of the third pillar, which, owing to the nature of its 
subject-matter, is capable of affecting the very heart of 
individual freedom, the foundation of the other freedoms.”32 
  
                                                           
31 F.Geyer supra. n.13 at p.161 
32 Case 303/05 at para.79 of the Opinion  
 Word Count: 32474                                                                       60 of 102 
 
This is something that must not be forgotten; without freedom in general, a person 
cannot benefit from any of the freedoms bestowed on to them by the EU’s legal order.  
 
Interestingly, it has also been suggested that this case could be a benchmark for how 
the Courts is likely to deal with the United Kingdom and Polish opt-outs from the 
binding effect of the Charter. The reason for this observation is the ruling 
demonstrates when the Charter is not legally binding33. However, it is contended that 
if this were to be the case it may actually result in a somewhat unusual outcome in 
that there would be little practical difference between those Member States who have 
signed up to the legally binding Charter and those who have not. If this were to be the 
case then it may suggest that if the United Kingdom and Poland did not object tothe 
ruling then their opt-out was a mere political façade more than a genuine distaste for 
fundamental rights protection stemming from the EU’s legal order.  
 
3.3.2 The Definition of “Resident” and “Staying” 
The case of Re Execution of European Arrest Warrant Issued Against Kozlowski34 
sought to discern what the scope of the terms “resident” and “staying” contained in 
Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision on the EAW. Article 4(6) states: 
“Grounds for optional non-execution of the European arrest 
warrant 
The executing judicial authority may refuse to execute the 
European arrest warrant: 
… 
(6) if the European arrest warrant has been issued for the 
purposes of execution or a custodial sentence or detention 
order, where the requested person is staying in, or is a national 
or resident of the executing Member State and that State 
undertakes to execute the sentence or detention order in 
accordance with its domestic law.” 
 
The case concerned Kozlowski who had been sentenced to five months imprisonment 
in Poland. The sentence had become final but was never executed. He was latterly in 
prison in Stuttgart in Germany. The Polish issued an EAW for Kozlowski to the 
German executing authority to request them to surrender Kozlowski for the purpose 
of carrying out the five month sentence. As such the German executing authority 
                                                           
33 F.Geyer supra. n.13 at p.159 
34 Case C-66/08 17 July 2008 [2008] 3 CMLR 26 
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asked the German court to authorise the EAW, but first the German court made the 
preliminary reference on the meaning of the terms “staying” and “resident”.  
 
It was ruled that the words “staying” and “resident” were to be given autonomous and 
uniform interpretations as they “concern autonomous concepts of Union law”35. When 
looking at theses concepts, the Court ruled that “the terms “resident” and “staying” 
cover, respectively, the situations in which the person who is the subject of a 
European arrest warrant has either established his actual place of residence in the 
executing Member State or has acquired, following a stable period of presence in that 
State, certain connections with that State which are of a similar degree to those 
resulting from residence.”36 Thus the Court goes on to note that certain objective 
factors should be looked at to decide whether a person is “staying” in the Member 
State, such as “the length, nature and conditions of his presence and the family and 
economic connections which he has with the executing Member State.”37 In line with 
these issues, Kozlowski was not considered to be “staying” in Germany, in light of the 
weak family and economic factors and as such Article 4(6) did not apply. 
 
The fact that the definition of “staying” and “resident” were to be given autonomous 
and uniform interpretations of EU law is unsurprising; over the years the EU has felt 
the need for EU definitions so as to avoid the fragmentation of EU law through 
Member State courts creating their own definitions38. This is further explained by one 
commentator in that, “Should it be left completely up to the Member States to give 
shape to the terms ‘staying’ and ‘resident’, which are part of an optional ground for 
refusal, that ground for refusal could have divergent meanings in the different 
Member States. This would impede the effectiveness of the surrender system.”39  
 
It has been contended that the Court’s view on the national courts’ interpretation of 
these concepts is that they ought not be too broad. It is argued, this means “an 
                                                           
35 Case C-66/08 at para.43 of the Ruling 
36 ibid. at para.46  
37 ibid. at para.48  
38 For instance the definition of a ‘Court’ or ‘Tribunal’ for the purposes of the Preliminary Reference 
Procedure laid out in article 267 TFEU 
39 M.J.Borgers ‘Mutual Recognition and the European Court of Justice: The Meaning of Consistent 
Interpretation and Autonomous and Uniform Interpretation of Union Law for the Development of the 
Principle of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters’ 2010 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice Vol.18 pp.99 - 114 at p.104 
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interpretation that leads to refusal of surrender sooner than it would have resulted on 
the basis of a uniform and autonomous interpretation.”40 It is perhaps odd that the 
Court recognises any broader or narrower definition and not just the broader 
definition which may lower mutual recognition between the States. 
 
The Urgent Procedure 
There are two cases which were dealt with under this procedure. The case of 
Santesteban Goicoechea41 concerned the situation where extradition was requested by 
the Spanish government before and after January 1, 2004. The first request was 
denied by a French court because the ground for the offences for which extradition 
was requested was statutorily time barred in France. The second time this was 
requested by the Spanish Government, in March 2004, it was held that the request had 
to be dealt with under the Extradition Convention which was in place before the 
EAW. The defendant was actually serving a sentence in France, and either way 
extradition could not take place until after that sentence had been served. Another 
request was then made by the Spanish authorities on his release from French prison. 
Santesteban asked the Court to decide on whether it would be contrary to the general 
principles of law within the EU, especially those of legal certainty, legality and non-
retroactivity of the more severe criminal law, to apply the 1996 Convention to him in 
respect of acts which the French Court declared to be statutorily barred under French 
law. However, it was ruled in the case that this issue was not one for the CJEU to 
make a preliminary ruling on; that was the remit of the national courts.  
 
Other issues included the temporal aspects of the conventions and EAW.  
 
In the case of Leymann and Pustovarov42, the preliminary reference was made on the 
issue of the interpretation on Articles 27(2) to (4) of the Framework Decision on the 
EAW43. The reference was made by a Finnish court where criminal proceedings 
against the defendants for a serious narcotics offence were taking place after an EAW 
                                                           
40 M.J.Borgers supra. n.39 at pp.107-108 
41  Case C-296/08 PPU [2008] 3 CMLR 40 
42  Case C-388/08 [2008] ECR I-8993 
43 Article27 of the Framework Decision on the EAW relates to ‘Possible prosecution for other 
offences’ 
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was issued.44 Both of the defendants in the case had been surrendered on the basis of 
importing, with the intention to sell, of amphetamines45. However, they were 
subsequently being prosecuted for the offence of importing of hashish with the 
intention to sell. Thus the questions referred to the Court were “what the decisive 
criteria are which would enable it [the referring court] to determine whether the 
person surrendered is being prosecuted for an ‘offence other’ than that for which he 
was surrendered within the meaning of article 27(2) of the Framework Decision, 
making it necessary to apply the consent procedure laid down in article 27(3)(g) and 
27(4)?”46  
 
The Court ruled that it depends upon the constituent elements of the offence, subject 
to the legal description given by the issuing State, and whether there is a sufficient 
correlation between the information given in the arrest warrant and that contained in 
the later procedural document. As such, a change in the type of narcotics is not 
enough to constitute an ‘offence other’ than that for which the person was surrendered 
within the meaning of article 27(2) of the Framework Decision of the EAW47. 
 
The Santesteban case was dealt with under the ‘urgent procedure’, as a result of the 
defendant being detained in custody. As a result, the position set forth by the 
Advocate General in the case is under strict time constraints48, as is the Court. As a 
result, some of the detail that the Advocate General usually delves into may be lost to 
the overall detriment of EU law. Although the need for a speedy resolution of 
preliminary references is of the greatest importance when a person’s liberty is being 
deprived, this should not be to the detriment to the overall coherence of EU law.  
 
It is somewhat unfortunate that the Court could not have delved into the matter set 
forth by the defendant Santesteban. It has been contended that in certain instances the 
Court uses sweeping statements with regard to the ‘general principles of Union law’, 
and the particular issues raised by the defendant were quite noteworthy and may have 
                                                           
44 Case C-388/08 PPU at para.2 of the Ruling 
45 ibid at para.19 and 21  
46 Case C-388/08 PPU at para.41 of the Ruling   
47 ibid at para.76  
48 As explained by AG Sharpston in ‘The Workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union – 
European Union Committee – Appendix 5: Written Evidence of Advocate General Sharpston’ at  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeucom/128/12816.htm accessed on 22nd 
August 2012  
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provided a strong, reasoned argument of the Court on the matter. The case does not, 
however, provide any other further enlightenment on issues of either fundamental 
rights or fundamental freedoms.  
 
On the other hand, the Leymann and Pustovarov case concerned some particularly 
notable issues and makes some very valid points. It was pointed out that the speciality 
rule which is laid down in Article 27(2) is “linked to the sovereignty of the executing 
Member State and confers on the person requested the right not to be prosecuted, 
sentenced or otherwise deprived of liberty except for which he or she was 
surrendered.”49 This is an important point and a person should not be handed over for 
the purpose of an EAW for one crime in order to then find themselves being accused 
of others. In light of this point however, another equally important point arises:  
“To require the consent of the executing Member State for 
every modification of the description of the offence would go 
beyond what is implied by the speciality rule and interfere 
with the objective of speeding up and simplifying judicial 
cooperation of the kind referred to in the Framework Decision 
between the Member States.”50 
 
This is a perfectly reasonable suggestion. It would be disproportionate to stop 
proceedings against someone as a result of minor changes to the offence. In this 
particular case it is clear that regardless of whether the drugs were amphetamines or 
hashish, a serious drug offence was still being committed. Moreover, to stop charges 
as a result of what would essentially be a minor procedural issue would make a 
mockery of the AFSJ. 
  
As already noted, this case is another which was undertaken using the urgent 
procedure as a result of the fact that Mr Pustovarov was “in custody serving a 
sentence of imprisonment for various offences”51. Again, similar to the issues which 
were suggested regarding Santesteban in this regard, fundamental rights protection 
should not be compromised in order for decisions to be made more quickly. 
 
                                                           
49 Case C-388/08 PPU at para.44 of the Ruling  
50 ibid at para.56  
51 ibid at para.39  
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Optional Grounds for Non-Execution  
The case of Criminal Proceedings Against Wolzenburg52 concerned, in part, one of 
the optional grounds for non-execution of an EAW. The defendant Wolzenburg was 
given a suspended custodial sentence for numerous offences in 2003. He then moved 
to the Netherlands in 2005. However after he had moved to the Netherlands, a 
German court revoked the suspended sentence as he had infringed the conditions of 
that suspended sentence. Wolzenberg was then arrested in the Netherlands subsequent 
to a German arrest warrant being sent out for him. He sought to resist surrender by 
relying on Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision on the EAW. The optional grounds 
for non-execution were that the requested person must either be staying in, a national 
of or a resident of the executing Member State. However, the defendant had difficulty 
claiming he was a resident as a result of the conditions laid down in the Netherlands 
which required him to have a residence permit of indefinite duration.  
 
As such a preliminary ruling was requested on a number of issues. The Court ruled on 
the length of time a person must be resident in a Member State so as to allow them to 
fall within the scope of Article 4(6). On this point the Court stated that time on its 
own is not a conclusive factor but one of many which should be taken into 
consideration by the executing authority53. It was also queried whether additional 
requirements such as administrative requirements could preclude the use of Article 
4(6). This too was not agreed by the Court, which stated that the time requirement 
was sufficient54. Questions were also raised in respect of Article 12 on non-
discrimination.  
 
The case of Proceedings concerning IB55 related to whether an EAW fell within 
Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision, or whether it fell under Article 5(3) of the 
Framework Decision. The case concerned a Romanian national who was convicted in 
Romania for certain criminal offences, and received a sentence of four years 
imprisonment to be served under supervised release. This sentence was upheld on 
appeal, however, this ruling was made in absentia and the defendant had not been 
informed of the ruling. The Supreme Court of Romania had held that the sentence 
                                                           
52 Case C-123/08 [2010] 1 CMLR 33 
53 Case C-123/08 at paras.75-76 of the Court’s Ruling 
54 ibid in the Order at para.2 
55 Case C-306/09 21 October 2010 [2011] 1 WLR 2227 
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should be undertaken in custody. The defendant then fled to Belgium, not having 
served any part of the sentence and settled there. Consequently an EAW was sent out 
for the defendant. An issue rose in the process of execution of the EAW. This 
question was whether the warrant was to be considered a warrant which had been 
issued for the purposes of execution of a custodial sentence, within the meaning of 
Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision or, since the defendant was entitled to a 
retrial under Romanian law as he had been sentenced in absentia, as a warrant which 
had been issued for the purpose of prosecution, within the meaning of Article 5(3). On 
top of that, the issue was whether, depending on this being a warrant for the execution 
of a sentence or for a prosecution, that person could be returned to the executing state 
under Article 5(1) to serve any sentence passed against him following a retrial in the 
issuing state.  
 
It was ruled by the Court that, the person could be returned to the executing Member 
State where a person had been sentenced in absentia to execute their sentence, that 
person being a national or resident of the executing state.  The Court stated that: 
“Given that the situation of a person who was sentenced in 
absentia and to whom it is still open to apply for a retrial is 
comparable to that of a person who is the subject of a 
European arrest warrant for the purposes of prosecution, there 
is no objective reason precluding an executing judicial 
authority which has applied article 5(1) of Framework 
Decision 2002/584 from applying the condition contained in 
article 5(3) of that Framework Decision.”56 
 
This case highlights the situation between the prior EC Treaty and the EU Treaty, and 
the different aims to which they intended to meet. What is contended is that in this 
particular case, the EC Treaty articles are given higher importance and a connection 
between the two Treaties is found in order to allow the EC Treaty articles to apply. As 
such the Court stated that: 
“The Member States cannot, in the context of the 
implementation of a framework decision, infringe Community 
law, in particular the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to 
freedom accorded to every citizen of the Union to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States.”57 
 
Thus had Mr.Wolzenberg been surrendered under an EAW and sent back to Germany, 
                                                           
56 Case C-306/09 at para.57 of the Ruling 
57 Case C-123/08 at para.45 of the Ruling  
 Word Count: 32474                                                                       67 of 102 
 
his home State, this would have perhaps been a better outcome for the objectives of 
the AFSJ but would have intruded upon those most basic fundamental freedoms set 
out in the former EC Treaty.  
 
Another important matter brought up in this case is that there should be some margin 
of appreciation with regard to the optional grounds of non-execution, even in light of 
mutual recognition. The point being that, “by limiting the situations in which the 
executing judicial authority may refuse to execute a European arrest warrant, such 
legislation only facilitates the surrender of requested persons, in accordance with the 
principle of mutual recognition…”58 Thus, mutual recognition means that in reality 
there are fewer instances where execution will not take place, and in light of the 
relatively small number of instances in which non-execution could apply, there should 
be a margin of appreciation. This is understandable, particularly in light of the fact 
that fundamental freedoms may be being removed as a result of execution.  
 
Again in this case, there is the idea of reintegration into society. It has been noted by 
the Court that there should be some kind of real bond which connects the requested 
person with the society he or she wants to be in after any sentence has been 
imposed59. It is argued by one commentator that the Kozlowski ruling puts a greater 
weight on this issue than the subsequent case of Wolzenburg: 
“It is clear at any rate that the ECJ established a certain order 
of rank in these judgments: the importance of reintegration 
into society is not so compelling that it can block surrender, 
and is thus not an importance which, as it were, is higher in 
rank than the principle of mutual recognition.”60 
 
Thus mutual recognition continues to be of prime importance within this particular 
field of PJCC. 
 
The case of IB is one of the more recent cases in the CJEU. It deals with the 
noteworthy issue of in absentia hearings. In terms of such a trial, convictions which 
are made in absentia are considered to be “fundamentally unfair”61. This therefore 
                                                           
58 Case C-123/08 at para.59  
59 ibid at para.66 
60 M.J.Borgers supra.n.39 at p.110 
61 D. Krapac ‘Verdicts in absentia’ in R.Blextoon and W.van Bllegooij supra.n.5 at p.119 
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often provides grounds, in traditional extradition law, not to execute the extradition.62 
Thus this case concerns the fairness of proceedings which have been undertaken 
outwith the presence of the accused, not through the accused’s own fault, as well as 
the issue of where he would serve any sentence set at a retrial. 
 
One point made by the Court in reference to the issue of returning to the executing 
state is that of reintegration into society of the offender63. The person has the right, 
after the sentence has been undertaken, to be in a place where there is the highest 
possible chance of a successful reintegration into society. The Court puts a great deal 
of emphasis on this point. Thus the defendant’s freedom of movement is not impeded 
as a result of any possible sentence, custodial or otherwise.  
 
An interesting contention is made by Advocate General Cruz Villalón in this case: 
“Although mutual recognition is an instrument for 
strengthening the area of freedom, security and justice, it is 
equally true that the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms is a precondition which gives legitimacy to the 
existence and development of this area.”64 
 
This suggests that perhaps the competing interests are not, in certain cases, 
fundamental rights versus fundamental freedoms, but actually mutual recognition 
versus fundamental rights and freedoms combined.  
 
3.4 The European Arrest Warrant, Schengen and ‘Ne Bis In Idem’ Case 
Analyses 
 
What is ‘ne bis in idem’? 
The principle of ne bis in idem states that a person should not be prosecuted more than 
once for the same offence or offences. Although in the context of this chapter, the 
principle has a cross-border element, it applies equally within domestic legal orders65. 
                                                           
62 D. Krapac supra. n.61 at p.119  
63 Case C-306/09 at para.52 of the Ruling 
64 Case C-306/09 at para.43 of the Opinion 
65 H. van der Wilt ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the principle ne bis in idem’ in R.Blextoon and 
W.van Ballegoij supra.n.5 at p.99. Interestingly there have been reforms made to the Scottish rules on 
ne bis in idem, otherwise commonly known as ‘double jeopardy’, in the form of the Double Jeopardy 
(Scotland) Act 2011 
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This principle can be construed to be a fundamental right and is referred to in the 
ECHR66.  
The necessity for the rule has been explained by one commentator: 
“Apart from being extremely unjust to the person concerned, a 
second prosecution erodes legal certainty and thus public 
confidence in the legal authority of the state…”67 
 
Thus it is clear why the rule of ne bis in idem exists. It becomes even more important 
in the cross-border, multi-jurisdictional instances which the EU lends itself to. It is of 
prime importance that once someone has been prosecuted in one State, then they 
should not fear prosecution again and again, in different jurisdictions, as a result of 
utilizing free movement rights. Interestingly, however, it has been noted that “its [the 
ne bis in idem principle] international ramifications are less self-evident.”68 That 
being said however, there have been international instruments which have codified the 
principle to a certain extent. This can be seen in the Convention Implementing the 
Schengen Agreement (CISA) 69, in Articles 54 to 58 and in the Charter at Article 5070 
 
Thus the CISA was the first EU-related instrument to handle the issue of cross-border 
ne bis in idem, as this agreement related to the gradual abolition of checks at their 
common borders. Thus there have been a number of cases relating to different issues, 
some of which will be analysed below to demonstrate the issues which have or may 
be likely to cause difficulties when enforcing the EAW.  
 
Development through Schengen Case Law 
It has been said that “The set of judgments on ne bis in idem is simply the start of the 
important role of the ECJ in the area of European criminal justice.”71 An important 
case on ne bis in idem was the case of R v Gözütok and Brügge72. This case concerned 
the issue of further proceedings being barred after out of court settlements had been 
                                                           
66 See Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Seventh Protocol to the ECHR 
67 H. van der Wilt supra.n.65 at p.99 
68 ibid.at p.100 
69 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, Schengen 19 June 1990 
70 “No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which 
he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law.” 
71 J.A.E Vervaele ‘Fundamental rights in the European Space for Freedom, Security and Justice: The 
Praetorian ne bis in idem principle of the Court of Justice’ in de Hoyos Sancho, M (Ed) supra. n.7 at 
p.99 
72 Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 [2003] 2 CMLR 2  
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made in each instance. The main issue turned on whether or not CISA Article 13 
would apply in the instances where the proceedings were barred as a result of the 
prosecution being discontinued, and also in the instance where there had not been any 
judicial involvement. The Court’s ruling on these points dealt with a point of 
interpretation in a sense; on the matter of what amounted to a case being “finally 
disposed of”.  
 
The Court held that ne bis in idem does apply in the disposal of a case, through means 
such as a fine etc, without the involvement of a court.73 The Court pointed out that the 
aims of the Treaty were the “maintaining and developing the Union as an area of 
freedom, security and justice in which the free movement of persons is assured”74 
Thus the overall importance of freedom of movement is elucidated in the Court’s 
ruling75, as is the importance of the protection against being put in ’double jeopardy’. 
However the Court seems to protect this fundamental right in light of the fact it could 
negatively impact on the fundamental freedom of free movement rights76. This is 
particularly interesting in light of the fact that “The ECJ did not directly discuss the 
words to be found prior to “finally disposed of” in Article 54 – “whose trial””77. 
 
Another interesting point which the Court makes is that, “…if Art.54 of CISA were to 
apply only to decisions discontinuing prosecutions which are taken by a Court or take 
the form of a judicial decision, the consequence would be that the ne bis in idem 
principle laid down in that provision (and, thus, the freedom of movement which the 
latter seeks to facilitate) would be of benefit only to the defendants who were guilty of 
offences which - on account of their seriousness or the penalties attaching to them - 
preclude use of a simplified method of disposing of certain criminal cases by a 
procedure whereby further prosecution is barred, such as the procedures at issue in the 
main action.”78 This is a noteworthy point, showing that unintended consequences can 
result without proper care and attention to the facts at hand.  
 
                                                           
73 Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 at para.48 of the Ruling 
74 ibid. at para.36 of the Ruling  
75 H. van der Wilt ibid. at p110 
76 ibid. at para.38 of the Ruling 
77 G.Conway ‘Judicial interpretation and the Third Pillar’ 2005 European Journal of Crime, Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice, Vol.13(2) pp.255-283 at p.279  
78 Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 at para.40 of the Ruling 
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With regard to this case, one commentator has made a particularly notable point, in 
that “the ECJ makes an explicit connection with the free movement of persons. If 
persons want to exercise this right effectively, they must be able to trust that decisions 
on the final barring of prosecution will be respected by other Member States.”79 
Furthermore, this ‘landmark’ case provides settled case law that for any EAW cases, 
an out of court settlement will mean the executing Member State will be able to apply 
ne bis in idem and not grant an EAW80. 
 
A very interesting case is that of Criminal Proceedings against Gasparini81, 
particularly in light of the differing opinions of Advocate General Sharpston from the 
Court itself. The case concerned olive oil which was being imported from outside the 
EU, from Turkey and Tunisia, and through the port of Setúbal in Portugal. The 
defendants had created a system of falsifying the documents which made it appear as 
though the olive oil came from Switzerland. Two of the defendants had been acquitted 
in Portugal of offences as a result of the offences being statutorily time barred. A 
Spanish Court (the Audiencia Provincial de Málaga) thus requested a preliminary 
ruling from the CJEU on a number of issues, one of which “is the finding by the 
courts of one Member State that prosecution of an offence is time-barred binding on 
the courts of the other Member States?”82 This is a particularly interesting question in 
light of the fact that time bar is essentially a procedural matter, not a substantive 
criminal law. The overall finding of the Court was that the principle of ne bis in idem 
enshrined in CISA Article 54 would be applicable in light of where a defendant had 
been acquitted as a result of the proceedings being time barred in another Member 
State83.  
 
The Court came to this conclusion based on the fact that to rule otherwise would be in 
opposition to the objectives set out by CISA (i.e. to avoid people being prosecuted 
more than once based upon the same set of facts), as well as the principle of mutual 
trust.84 This may be the answer that one would have anticipated that the Court would 
give, however it is in quite stark contrast to what the Advocate General posited in her 
                                                           
79 M.J.Borgers supra. at n.39. p.167 
80 H.van der Wilt supra. n.65 at p.110-111 
81 Case C-467/04 [2007] 1 CMLR 12 
82 Case C-467/04 at para.20 of the Ruling 
83 ibid. at para.33  
84 ibid. at paras.28, 30  
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Opinion. It is contended that her arguments merit serious consideration. The 
arguments suggested by the Advocate General were based on the idea that the ne bis 
in idem principle should apply depending on whether the facts of the case have been 
proven before being finally disposed of85. The Opinion of the Advocate General was 
that the ‘substance based approach’ proffered by certain Member States in their 
pleadings was the correct option. Thus where the material facts in a case had not been 
proven, then ne bis in idem would not apply. In support of the Opinion, a number of 
cases were cited86, including some EU competition case law on the imposition of 
sanctions87. The Advocate General noted a general lack of consistency amongst the 
CJEU case law on matters regarding ne bis in idem88. What is contended is that the 
Advocate General puts a great deal of emphasis on providing a balance “between free 
movement of persons and the requirements of combating crime and providing a high 
level of safety within ‘an area of freedom, security and justice’.”89 The Advocate 
General continues: 
 
“…the substance-based approach seems to me to strike a more 
appropriate balance between the two desirable objectives of 
promoting free movement of persons, on the one hand, and 
ensuring that free movement rights are exercised within an 
area of “freedom, security and justice” characterised by a high 
level of safety, in which crime is effectively controlled, on the 
other hand…neither article 2 nor article 29 EU gives priority 
to free movement of persons over the prevention and 
combating of crime and the attainment of a high level of 
safety.”90  
 
It is submitted that there is great worth in this argument. As opposed to standing in the 
way of prosecutions which have been barred for a procedural reason with no attention 
to the material facts of the case, these could take place so as to increase the likelihood 
of a safer European Union. In a sense, to allow a person not to be prosecuted as a 
result of a time bar, that person on the one hand may evade a punishment they deserve 
                                                           
85 Case C-467/04 at para.120 of the Opinion 
86 These included R v Gözütok and Brügge ibid; Miraglia Case C-469/03 [2005] ECR I-2009; and Van 
Esbroeck Case C-436/04 [2006] 3 CMLR 6   
87 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij v Commission C 238, 244, 245, 247, 250-252 & 254/99 P [2002] 
ECR I-8375; and aAalborg Portland v Commission C 204, 205, 211, 213, 217 & 219/00 P [2004] ECR 
I-123 (Cement)  
88 Case C-467/04 at para.63 of the Opinion 
89 ibid.; title to section beginning para.82 
90 ibid. at para.97  
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for a crime they have committed, putting the safety of others at risk but also they are 
eradicated of the chance to clear their name on the true merits of the case. While it is 
noted that further difficulties could arise from this substance-based model (for 
instance what are the material facts; if one issue is not dealt with before the case is 
finally disposed of, can another Member State then still take proceedings?), the 
essence of what the Advocate General is saying should not be lost. From her 
viewpoint, if a ’hierarchy of norms’ as such were to exist, there is nothing to say that 
fundamental free movement rights would be at the top of such a hierarchy. In contrast, 
it seems that the norms which would be of greatest value to the Advocate General 
would in fact be those of free movement within a safe area. As such the fundamental 
right which the ne bis in idem principle provides would only be of prime importance 
in certain circumstances.  
 
It is understandable why the Court did reject this view; in reality ne bis in idem is a 
strong safeguard which should only be dispensed with at very specific times which 
are provided for in legal instruments. Thus it is contended that the Court puts the 
fundamental rights of those exercising their fundamental freedoms at the height of 
their importance. This suggests that perhaps, in the case of CISA and the EAW at 
least, the fundamental rights are not actually competing against each other.  
 
However, criticism has been levelled at both the Advocate General and the Court in 
this case for failing to differentiate between nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem 
causa (no one should have to face more than one prosecution for the same offence) 
and nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto (nobody ought to be punished twice for the 
same offence. It was noted that: 
 
“It is surprising that neither the AG nor the Court had studied 
whether the ne bis is idem of Article 54 of the CISA also 
includes the ne bis in idem vexari. They have limited 
themselves to dealing with the time-barred aspect of the 
criminal action in the context of a judgment considered idem 
factum…it is a mistaken path to follow.”91   
 
Interestingly, both these cases make a point of noting the lack of any requirement of 
                                                           
91 J.A.E Varvaele supra.at n.71 at p.98 
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harmonisation in the field of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
(PJCC)92. 
 
The European Arrest Warrant and ‘ne bis is idem’ 
It has been noted that, “The CISA case law represents a significant contribution of the 
ECJ to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, especially as far as the principle of 
non bis in idem embodied in article 54 of the CISA is concerned.”93 It can be asserted 
that the Schengen acquis has provided illustrative examples of issues which arise in 
relation to ne bis in idem, with just a few of the rulings being discussed above94. 
 
In terms of the Framework Decision on the EAW, Article 3 on the ’Ground for 
mandatory non-execution of the European arrest warrant’ states that: 
 
“The judicial authority of the Member State of execution 
(hereinafter ‘executing judicial authority’) shall refuse to 
execute the European arrest warrant in the following cases: 
… 
(2) if the executing judicial authority is informed that the 
requested person has been finally judged by a Member State in 
respect of the same acts provided that, where there has been 
sentence, the sentence has been served or is currently being 
served or may no longer be executed under the law of the 
sentencing Member State”  
 
As such, the issues which are liable to come before the Court (or have regarding ne 
bis in idem in other areas) are the definitions of ‘finally judged’ and ‘same acts’. An 
example of this is in the case below.   
 
The case of Criminal Proceedings against Mantello95 is a case which involves the 
EAW and ne bis in idem specifically. This case concerns the issue of what constitutes 
the ‘same acts.’ Mantello was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for unlawful 
possession of cocaine in November 2005 in Italy. In November 2008 a national arrest 
warrant was sent out in relation to Mantello and 76 other co-accused based on 
allegations that between January 2004 and November 2005 they played a major role 
                                                           
92 Joined Cases C-187/01 and Case C-385/01 at para.32; Case C-467/04 at para.29 
93 K.Lenaerts ‘The Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the area of freedom, security and 
justice’ 2010 ICLQ Vol.59(2) pp.255-301 at p.300 
94 Due to the length of this piece, the whole Schen acquis will not be analysed 
95 Case C-261/09 [2011] 2 CMLR 5 
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in a large criminal organisation who were trafficking cocaine in Italy and Germany 
and were supplying to third parties. Seeing this arrest warrant on the Schengen 
Information System (SIS), the German authorities arrested Mantello in December 
2008. It was declared by the Italian Court that the prior conviction of November 2005 
did not preclude the criminal proceeding referred to in the EAW and thus they were 
not subject to ne bis in idem. However, the referring court (Oberlandsgericht 
Stuttgart, Germany) queried whether it might oppose the execution on the warrant 
based on the fact that the Italian investigating authorities had sufficient evidence at 
the time of the investigation in 2004, with which to charge Mantello for the offences 
in the EAW, but had not submitted that evidence for consideration at the trial. Thus 
the question put to the Court was to interpret the term ‘same acts’ in Article 3(2) 
(which amounts to ne bis in idem in the legislation) of the Framework Decision on the 
EAW in the circumstances of the case.  
 
It was ruled in this case by the Court that the concept of ‘same acts’ as provided for in 
Article 3(2) constitutes an autonomous concept of EU law96. The Court went on in its 
ruling to say: 
 
“…the issuing judicial authority…expressly stated that the 
earlier judgment delivered under its legal system did not 
constitute a final judgment covering the acts referred to in the 
arrest warrant issues by it and therefore did not preclude the 
criminal proceedings referred to in that arrest warrant, the 
executing judicial authority has no reason to apply, in 
connection with such a judgment, the ground for mandatory 
non-execution provided for in article 3(2) of the Framework 
Decision.”97 
 
The Court looked at a number of issues when making this ruling. Again, the 
importance of mutual trust and recognition, as well as the objectives of the 
Framework Decision on the EAW were alluded to98. The rulings on what ‘same acts”’ 
constituted in the context of CISA were also looked to by the Court. The Court noted 
that in that context, ‘same acts’ could be defined as “referring only to the nature of the 
acts, encompassing a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked 
                                                           
96 Case C-261/09 ibid. at para.51 of the Ruling. For a discussion on the concepts of autonomous 
interpretation within EU law see M.J.Borgers supra. n.39.  
97 Case C-261/09 at para.51 of the Ruling  
98 ibid. at para.35-37   
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together, irrespective of the legal classification given to them or the legal interest 
protected.”99 The Court thus decided that the issue of interpretation actually related 
more to the idea of ‘finally judged’ than ‘same acts’. Notably though, it is for the 
Member States laws to decide where an issue has been ‘finally judged’.100 As a result 
of the Italian laws, the case had not been finally judged and thus there was no reason 
for the German court to apply the mandatory reason for non-execution.  
 
Perhaps it is surprising that the Court decided not to give the definition of ‘finally 
judged’ an autonomous interpretation within the EU, in light of so many EU 
interpretations for uniformity; perhaps what is more surprising is that given the facts 
of the case, substantially similar criminal acts were allowed to be prosecuted twice. It 
is submitted that this may have been the case given the nature of the second offence - 
a criminal organisation with a large number of people involved. It is contended that 
there may have been a feeling that not to allow for the prosecution in 2008 would 
have been to the detriment to the whole AFSJ - and as a result, the fundamental right 
of the accused safeguarded by ne bis in idem have been ignored somewhat. 
 
It is probable that other such cases may arise on this matter, particularly given the 
aforementioned proponents of the Framework Decision on the EAW.  
 
3.5 Contrast to Framework Decision on Victims’ Rights  
In the aforementioned case of Gözütok and Brügge, a noteworthy matter was put 
forward by the Belgian government, who argued that settlements in criminal 
proceedings are likely to “prejudice the rights of the victim”101.However, in this case 
the Court argued that the objective of the ne bis in idem principle is only to preclude a 
State from prosecuting a person who has already had their case finally disposed of102. 
Thus the priority in this instance appears to be that of the fundamental rights of the 
accused who has used their fundamental freedoms, as opposed to the rights of the 
victim. That being said however, the Court does note that ne bis in idem does not 
prevent the victim from bringing a civil action against the accused.103 Although this 
                                                           
99 Case C-261/09 at para.39   
100 ibid. at para.46   
101 Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 at para.47 of the Ruling  
102 Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 at para.47 of the Ruling 
103 ibid.  
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may seem like an inadequate alternative for the victim, there is at least some avenue 
for restitution as a result of the damage caused.  
 
The natural requirement for cross-border element in EAW is one which is not inherent 
in victims’ rights. Another important issue has been underlined by one commentator 
regarding Gözütok and Brügge, that the suggestion from this case is that the 
protection of ne bis in idem is confined to those who are “entitled to free 
movement.”104 
 
Ultimately however, both areas within Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters have given rise to CJEU rulings of constitutional importance and have 
provided some illustrative examples of how the Court will likely develop its 
fundamental rights and freedoms arguments in the future. 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
There is a strong emphasis in the Framework Decision itself, and in its case law, on 
fundamental rights. For instance, paragraph 12 of the Preamble makes reference to 
respect for fundamental rights and to the Charter. The cases concern important 
fundamental rights principles such as double criminality, ne bis in idem, and in 
absentia trials. These are all issues which are at the heart of the idea of the right to a 
fair trial, as enshrined in both the Charter and the ECHR. This does not mean 
however, that one should underestimate the importance of free movement rights in 
this case law. In fact it is the very essence of the whole idea of the European Arrest 
Warrant that people have the right to move freely within the EU territory in an AFSJ.  
 
However, this chapter has shown that although in certain instances fundamental rights 
and fundamental freedoms are competing interests, there are often other competing 
issues which need due attention from the Court. In certain instances there have been 
diverging fundamental rights which have to be balanced; at others, fundamental rights 
and freedoms have competed together against the forces of mutual trust and 
recognition which is based at the very heart of the EAW. Contrasting Kozlowski and 
Wolzenberg highlights the differences which can result from assigning different 
                                                           
104 H. van der Wilt supra. n.65 at p110 
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weights to each respective issue. Issues, such as ne bis in idem and double criminality, 
make this area of the Court’s competence one which has a particularly high amount of 
diverging issues to consider.  
 
It is also clear that although both the EAW and the Framework Decision on Victims’ 
Rights are both part of the PJCC, the fundamental freedoms which are involved in 
each case can be extremely different. The next chapter will go on to examine how the 
recent developments on suspects’ rights may have diverging issues which could 
potentially fall in line with the Framework Decision on Victims’ Rights. However, 
this area is intrinsically linked with the EAW and therefore it provides an opportunity 
to discuss the competing fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms which are 
arising in this field of EU law.   
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Chapter 4: Suspects Rights in the European Union  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to look at the future of judicial decision making in the field of 
Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) through a discussion of 
suspects rights and thus on the recent proposed Directive on the Right of Access to a 
Lawyer in Criminal Proceedings1, as well as the Directives already enacted in this 
field2. Although as yet there have not been rulings delivered in the area of suspects 
and accused persons rights, it is submitted that by looking to the rulings on the 
Framework Decisions on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)3 and Victims Rights4, 
the issue of whether fundamental rights or fundamental freedoms would be the higher 
norm can be speculated upon.  
 
The chapter will note that there are important additional safeguards being provided for 
in this area. There are however, different safeguards which are provided for in the 
EAW, all of which realistically provide for an increase in the fundamental (procedural 
human) rights protection in this field, which the Court would no doubt draw upon. On 
the other hand, by contrasting the proposed Directive to the Framework Decision on 
Access to a Lawyer, it provides a contrast which suggests that the fundamental 
freedom of free movement will have to be in place before any such fundamental right 
can be invoked in the Courts.  
 
4.2 Suspects and Accused Persons Rights   
This area of law has been one of growth, particularly in the international arena. This 
stems from the overall Article 6 right to a fair trial as enshrined in the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Cases have come before the European Court 
                                                           
1 ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of access to a 
lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to communicate on arrest’ European Commission, 
2011/0154 (COD)  
2 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right 
to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings and Directive 2012/13/Eu of 22 May 2012 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the right to information in criminal proceedings  
3 Council Framework Decision 2002/584 (JHA) on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, hereinafter referred t o as EAW or the European Arrest Warrant  
4 Framework Decision on the Standing of the Victim in Criminal Proceedings of 15 March 2001, O.J. 
2001, L 82/1. 
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of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the issue of access to a lawyer during criminal 
proceedings5, as well as before national courts6. It was pointed out by one 
commentator in light of these decisions that, “It is well known that Scotland…has 
also been called upon recently to modify its historic practice to enable immediate 
access to lawyers in the police station.”7 Thus the focus on this area has been 
heightened as a result of cases which affect areas of national sensitivity and national 
sovereignty.  
 
As such, “A draft Directive was issued in June 2011 aiming to entrench in EU law the 
principles established in the recent ECtHR jurisprudence.”8 This was alongside the 
EU Council formally adopting the Directive on the ‘letter of rights’ on 26 April 2010. 
It was noted that “This Directive [that on the ‘letter of rights’] - the second in a series 
of measures under the ‘procedural rights Roadmap’ [the first being the Directive on 
interpretation and translation] adopted by the EU in late 2009 - aims to ensure 
stronger protection of fair trials across Europe.”9 
 
These three measures were taken after a somewhat contentious journey. Firstly, it was 
seen that the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) was legislating mainly in 
the ‘security’ field: 
 
“The idea of introducing a set of common (minimum) rules, 
guaranteeing the rights of defence at a EU-wide level, has not 
been accorded the same attention as the introduction of 
instruments aimed at improving the effectiveness of crime-
fighting.”10 
                                                           
5 See, for instance, Salduz v Turkey (2008) 49 EHRR 421; Dayanan v Turkey 2009 ECHR 7377/03 (13 
October 2009 ; Brusco v France (Application No 1466/07) (unreported) given 14 October 2010, 
ECtHR 
6 See, for instance, Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43 This Ruling was particularly interesting in 
light of the argument by the Lord Advocate that there were sufficient safeguards in the Scottish system 
as a whole, as a result of the principle of corroboration. However, the Court did not agree with this 
argument and held for the change in Scottish practice. See paras 27, 50, 92 and 102 
7 A.Dorange and S.Field ‘Reforming defence rights in French police custody: a coming together in 
Europe?’ 2012 International Journal of Evidence and Proof Vol.16(2) pp.153-174 at p.171. 
Interestingly the UK has considered opting-out of this Directive, the effects of which on British citizens 
was criticised, see ‘EU directive opt-out could hit Britons arrested abroad’ Guardian 7 September 
2010; ‘MPs reject directive on right to lawyer in criminal proceedings’ Solicitors Journal 2011 
Vol.155(35) p.3   
8 A.Dorange and S.Field supra. n.7 at p.174 
9 http://www.fairtrials.net/press/article/european-council-enacts-law-to-protect-fair-trial-rights accessed 
on 4 July 2012 
10 G.Vermuelen and L.van Puyenbroeck ‘Approximation and mutual recognition of procedural 
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As such there was a lacuna in legislation which was geared either to ‘freedom’ or 
‘justice’. In response to this, a Commission Green Paper on the protection of rights of 
the suspect or defendant during the proceedings11 has been published which led to a 
proposed Framework Decision on Certain Procedural Rights in Criminal proceedings 
(‘PFWD’)12. This was an ambitious proposal which dealt with the right to legal 
assistance and representation; the right to interpretation and/or translation; special 
protection for vulnerable groups; and, consular assistance. Much criticism was 
levelled at this proposal.13 However, “Although the Hague Programme called for the 
adoption of this proposal by the end of 2005, agreement on the substance appeared 
difficult to reach and several Member States had legal and political objections to an 
EU measure on this issue.”14  It has been pointed out that the “dividing line was the 
question of whether the Union was competent to legislate in purely domestic 
proceedings (at least 21 Member States share[d] this view or whether the legislation 
should be devoted solely to cross-border cases.”15 Nonetheless, the PFWD provided a 
basis which has subsequently been used in this field even after its abandonment in 
2007.  
 
The Council of the European Union latterly made a resolution on a Roadmap for 
strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal 
proceedings16. It has been stated that the Roadmap “set out its vision to foster the right 
to a fair trial in criminal proceedings across the EU.”17 The Roadmap itself intended 
to deal with six different measures (measures which are not dissimilar to those which 
were discussed in the PFWD):  
                                                                                                                                                                      
safeguards of suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union’ in ‘EU 
and International Crime Control. Topical Issues’ Governance of Security Research Paper Series Vol.4 
2010 Muklu Publishers Eds Cools et al. at p.44  
11 COM (2003) 75, 19 Feb 2003 
12 Commission Proposal for a council framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal 
proceedings throughout the European Union COM(2004) 328 final (28 April 2004)  
13 See C. Arangüena Fanego ’Procedural Guarantees if Suspects and Defendants’ in de Hoyos Sancho, 
M (Ed) ‘Criminal proceedings in the European Union: essential safeguards’ (Lex Nova, 2008) 
14 S.Peers ‘Justice and Home Affairs Law’2nd Ed. OUP at p.454  
15 Press Release on the 2807th Session of the Council on the 12th and 13th June, 2007[1026/07-Press 
125] as cited in  Ambos, K ‘Mutual recognition versus procedural guarantees’ in de Hoyos Sancho, M 
(Ed) supra. n.12 at p.35 fn.46 
16 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 (2009/C 295/01)  
17 M.Jimeno-Bulnes ‘Towards Common Standards on Rights of Suspected and Accused Persons in 
Criminal Proceedings in the EU’ CEPS ’Liberty and Security in Europe’ February 2010 at p.1   
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 Measure A: Translation and Interpretation  
 Measure B: Information on Rights and Information about the Charges 
 Measure C: Legal Advice and Legal Aid 
 Measure D: Communications with Relatives, Employers and Consular Authorities 
 Measure E: Special Safeguards for Suspected or Accused Persons who are 
Vulnerable 
 Measure F: A Green Paper on Pre-Trial Detention 
 
As has already been referred to, directives on translation and interpretation as well as 
on rights and charges have already become law. The proposed Directive on Access to 
a Lawyer is currently in the process of being negotiated, and the exact form it will 
take remains to be seen. The notable difference between the PFWD and the measures 
referred to is that these measures have been broken down into more discrete areas in 
which to legislate. Nonetheless, issues which the Court may face based upon these 
Directives raise interesting questions; at times a contrast can be drawn between the 
PFWD and the current Directives in place. The PFWD was established in a different 
legal context in that this was before the Treaty of Lisbon (and even the failed 
Constitutional Treaty) was in force. As such the legal basis upon which the PFWD 
was to be enacted under and which the Directives have been enacted under are 
different18.  
 
The Roadmap became part of the Stockholm programme which set out the legislative 
aims in this field for 2010 to 2014.19 
 
4.3 Suspects Rights, ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘the 
Charter’) 
As has already been mentioned, the area of protection of suspects’ rights is largely 
based upon the ECHR Article 6 right to a fair trial and the case law thereof. However, 
                                                           
18 Notably there was some controversy over the use of Article 31(1) TEU as the legal basis for the 
PFWD; for further reading, see R.Lööf ‘Shooting from the Hip: Proposed Minimum Rights in Criminal 
Proceedings throughout the EU’ 2006 ELJ Vol.12(3) pp.421-430 Perhaps had the legislative basis not 
changed, a challenge on the validity of this PFWD would have came about. Now the legislative basis is 
Article 82 and 83 TFEU. 
19 The Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, Council of 
the European Union, 5731/10 (3 March 2010) 
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there has been some argument that as a result of the safeguards provided for in the 
ECHR and other international instruments20 that protection by the EU in this field was 
unnecessary. As such why would the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
require to resolve issues in this field of fundamental rights at all when there is the 
ECtHR? There are many arguments as to why the CJEU should play a role in the 
protection of fundamental rights.  
 
It has been noted that, “The failure of this initiative [the PFWD] was mainly due to 
the hard opposition expressed by certain EU Member States’ delegations…which 
considered that the protection of procedural rights was already laid down in Arts.5 
and 6 of the ECHR and that this protection should be considered to be sufficient.”21 
However, it has been argued that the standards set out by the ECHR are an absolute 
minimum which relates to countries which are not part of the EU (such as Turkey). 
Thus “EU cooperation is at a far more advanced stage than that within the members of 
the Council of Europe.”22 
 
Furthermore, the number of applications to the ECtHR is exceptionally high and 
grows annually, making it difficult for citizens to realistically get to the Court and 
often signatories to the ECHR do not always amend their legislation to reflect the 
changes which have been determined the by the ECtHR judgments.23 Another 
interesting point made was that the ECHR does not provide rules of evidence and 
therefore “It often remains difficult to conclude from the ECHR’s decisions whether 
or to what extent the use of illegally or unfairly obtained evidence constitutes a 
violation.”24 
 
Interestingly, in the preamble to the Council Resolution on the Roadmap, it alludes to 
the problems with compliance with the ECHR more “subtly”: 
 
                                                           
20 For instance with regard to consular assistance there is the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations. With regard to right to legal assistance see also Art 14(3)(b) and (d) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
21 M.Jimeno-Bulnes supra. n.17 at p.4  
22 S.Douglas-Scott ‘Chapter 1 - Fundamental rights in EU justice and home affairs’ in M.Martin (Ed) 
‘Crime, rights and the EU future of police and judicial cooperation’ (Justice, 2008) at p.22 
23 G.Vermuelen and L.van Puyenbroeck supra. n.10 at p.49 
24 ibid. at p.50 
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“the Convention, as interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights, is an important foundation for Member States 
to have trust in each other‘s criminal justice systems and to 
strengthen trust. At the same time, there is room for further 
action on the part of the European Union to ensure full 
implementation and respect of Convention standards, and 
where appropriate, to ensure consistent application of the 
applicable standards and to raise existing standards.” 25 
 
This is further emphasised in the Directive on Interpretation and Translation which 
makes a similar point26. This underlines the fact that the EU has an awareness that 
often there are violations of the rights provided for by the ECHR and thus the EU 
should provide a set of rights which build upon the standards and cases which the 
ECtHR has judged upon.  
 
Nevertheless, then, although the EU has considered that the ECHR does not provide 
adequate protection in the field of defendants rights, the ECHR still provides the 
foundations for this field of competence. The EU has decided to supplement its only 
primary piece of legislation - the Charter in which Article 47 deals with the ’right to 
an effective remedy and a fair trial’ and Article 48 relates to the ‘presumption of 
innocence and right of defence’ - with secondary legislation on the matter. The 
Directives which have so far become law make explicit reference to both the ECHR 
and the Charter27. 
 
Thus the field of suspects and accused persons rights is based, at the most basic level, 
on fundamental human rights. This is exemplified by the fact that the area is based 
upon Article 6 of the ECHR and Articles 47 and 47 of the Charter. Interestingly 
Articles 5 (the right to liberty and security) and 6 of the ECHR are the most 
commonly cited in applications to the ECtHR28. Thus it is more than likely that the 
CJEU would have to put fundamental rights at the height of importance if a case were 
to be referred on this area. 
                                                           
25 L.van Puyenbroeck and G.Vermeulen“Towards minimum procedural guarantees for the defence in 
criminal proceedings in the EU” 2011 ICLQ Vol.60(4) pp.1017-1038 at p.1018 
26 See point 6 of the preamble to the Directive on interpretation and translation: “Although all Member 
States are party to the ECHR, experience has shown that that alone does not always provide a sufficient 
degree of trust in the criminal justice systems of other Member States” 
27 ibid. at point 6 of the Preamble on the Directive on Interpretation and Translation; see point 5 of the 
Preamble of the Directive on the Right to Information in Criminal Proceedings 
28 L.van Puyenbroeck and G.Vermeulen supra. n.25 at p.1018 
 Word Count: 32474                                                                       85 of 102 
 
  
4.4 Suspects and Accused Persons Rights and the EAW 
In the case of the EAW where the person is awaiting a trial, they are thus a suspect or 
accused person. There are however, certain special rights within the field of EAW; 
some of these are built in to the Framework Decision (FWD) on the EAW themselves 
and some are within the new Directives on suspects and accused persons rights. It has 
been pointed out that “The European Arrest Warrant is sometimes seen purely as a 
tool for efficient prosecution, and there are fears that it may have the effect of 
lowering respect for the fundamental rights of suspects and defendants. In some ways 
however, it may well enhance defendants’ rights.”29 As such, there have been some 
interesting safeguards provided only in respect of the EAW.  
 
Primarily, there have been some safeguards for suspects or accused persons built into 
the EAW since its implementation. These include the speciality rule,30 time limits for 
surrender31 and the ne bis in idem principle32. In Article 12 of the Framework 
Decision on the EAW, it refers to “a right to be assisted by a legal counsel and by an 
interpreter in accordance with the national law of the executing Member State”. Thus 
rights to an interpreter and a lawyer were already provided to those being requested 
under an EAW, although the form which this took was actually a lesser form than had 
originally being planned on: 
 
“Although the provision for legal advice and the services of an 
interpreter has been reduced by this reference to the national 
law of the executing Member State, this still fulfils the 
requirements of the ECHR.”33 
 
These provisions on the EAW are now supplemented elsewhere. For instance, with 
regard to the Directive on Interpretation and Translation, this is a right to 
                                                           
29 C.Morgan ‘The European Arrest Warrant and Defendants’ Rights: An Overview’ in (Eds) Judge 
Rob Blextoon and Wouter van Ballegoij ‘Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant’ TMC Asser 
Press 2005 at p.195 
30 Referred to in the previous chapter 
31 See Article 23 of Council Framework Decision 2002/584 (JHA) on the European arrest warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States, hereinafter referred t o as EAW or the European 
Arrest Warrant  
32 Referred to in the previous chapter 
33 C.Morgan supra. n.29. at p.205 
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interpretation in criminal proceedings and proceedings for the execution of an EAW34.  
 
Looking to the Directive on the right to information in proceedings, “This law ensures 
that anyone arrested or subject to a European Arrest Warrant in any EU Member State 
is given a Letter of Rights listing their basic rights during criminal 
proceedings…Currently the right to a Letter of Rights is only available in around one 
third of Member States.”35 The EAW is explicitly referred to in point 39 of the 
preamble to this Directive: 
 
“The right to written information about rights on arrest 
provided for in this Directive should also apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to persons arrested for the purpose of the execution 
of a European Arrest Warrant…” 
 
A specific model Letter of Rights is provided for in Annex II to this Directive and 
provides information on slightly different issues to the ‘traditional’ Letter of Rights. 
These are: 
 
 A - Information about the European Arrest Warrant; 
 B - Assistance of a Lawyer; 
 C - Interpretation and Translation;  
 D - Possibility to consent; and  
 E - Hearing36 
 
In the proposed Directive on Access to a Lawyer, the EAW is also referred to. 
However, for those involved in proceedings pursuant to an EAW, their rights are 
“more limited and less specific, as the merits of the case will then be discussed in the 
Member State which issued the EAW, where the full rights of access of Articles 3-4 
shall apply to the suspected or accused person”37. From the proposal, it appears that 
                                                           
34 Article 1(1) of the Directive on the Right to Interpretation and Translation  
35 Europa Press Releases - ‘EU-wide right to information at arrest is now law’ Brussels, 7 June 2012 
accessed 05/07/2012 
36 This is in contrast to the Indicative model Letter of Rights in Annex I which looks at A - assistance 
of a lawyer/entitlement to legal aid; B - information about the accusation; C - interpretation and 
translation; D - right to remain silent; E - access to documents; F - informing someone else about your 
arrest or detention/informing your consulate or embassy: G - urgent medical assistance. 
37 N.Joncheray and L.Manageress ‘The Proposal for a Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in 
criminal proceedings - A further step towards a European ius commune in criminal law or All Quiet on 
the Western Front?’ 2011 Maastricht Journal of International and Comparative Law Vol.18(3) pp.403-
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access to a lawyer is restricted to the initial stages of criminal proceedings38 which is 
understandable to an extent as the person subject of the EAW will receive assistance 
from a lawyer during the case when in the issuing state. 
 
It is clear why a person subject to an EAW is in a particularly vulnerable position and 
thus requires these safeguards additionally to those which are set out in the 
Framework Decision on the EAW itself. In a situation where “effective judicial 
cooperation in criminal proceedings according to the mutual recognition doctrine is 
partly dependant on a commonly accepted level of trust between the competent 
national authorities, which in turn requires the presence of a common set of minimum 
procedural guarantees for the defence.”39, and thus in reality there are no further 
checks on the practices in Member States as well as the fact that the EAW is 
essentially a faster version of extradition, people must know what they are facing.  
 
This comes in the form of the use of a language that will be understood, information 
as to their rights and, one would hope, to the access of a lawyer. This is necessary for 
the protection of EU citizens in EAW proceedings for it must be remembered that in 
certain instances this person is still only an accused to suspected person and is not a 
convicted criminal. Thus these issues of fundamental rights which take place 
meanwhile someone is using their fundamental freedom of free movement are ones 
which the Court may well have to call upon. 
  
4.5 Suspects and Accused Persons Rights and Victims Rights: A 
Comparison 
In a sense, the rights of victims in criminal proceedings and the rights of suspects and 
accused persons are somewhat juxtaposed. Nonetheless an interesting parallel can be 
drawn between the two issues. One of the most important features which has arisen 
from the CJEU case law on the Framework Decision on Victims Rights is that there 
was often no cross-border element in the cases, meaning a wholly internal situation 
which was void of any kind of fundamental freedom, i.e. there was no exercise of the 
free movement right of a citizen. The question then arises as to whether this is the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
410 at p.406 
38 Article 8 of the Proposal on the Directive for Access to a Lawyer in Criminal Proceedings 
39 L.van Puyenbroeck and G.Vermeulen supra. n.25 at p.1020-1021 
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case for the new legislation on suspects and accused persons rights.  
 
One can assume that when it comes to the Directive on Interpretation and Translation 
there is almost necessarily going to be a cross-border element; if a suspect were to be 
in their own State it is unlikely that they will need an interpreter. However in the 
instances of the Directive on Information for Suspects and the proposed Directive on 
Access to a Lawyer, the situation is not likely to be so straightforward. 
 
Primarily, with regard to the Directive on Information for Suspects, there is nothing to 
suggest that there is a requirement for there to be a cross-border element. Although 
the proposed Directive on Right to Access a Lawyer has not yet become law and as 
such there is still time for there to be changes to the proposed legislative measures as 
it stands, similarly there is little to suggest that there would be a requirement for a 
cross-border in that instance. It has been stated that, “Should the proposal be adopted 
as such, the Directive will apply to all criminal proceedings, regardless of the 
presence of any cross-border element.”40 This contention is made based upon the fact 
that there is no reference to a cross-border element to the criminal procedure. As such 
the proposed Directive will apply to a wholly internal situation and thus not only EU 
law but its interpretation would be exclusively within the competence of the CJEU. It 
has been suggested that this does stretch the EU’s competence in that what is taking 
place in reality is harmonisation41. There is also a suggestion that not to allow purely 
internal situations to come within the scope of the proposed Directive would be to the 
detriment of situations which may become later a cross-border one.42 
 
It has been pointed out that one of the main issues that the PFWD encountered was 
that it permitted wholly internal cases to come within its scope: 
 
“Probably the main dividing line was the question whether the 
EU was competent to legislate on purely domestic proceedings 
or whether the legislation should be devoted only to cross-
border cases.”43 
 
                                                           
40 N.Joncheray and L.Manageress supra. n.37 at p.407 
41 ibid. at p.407 
42 ibid. at p.407, p.409 
43  G.Vermuelen and L.van Puyenbroeck supra. n.10 at p.48 
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There has been a different view posited on the effects of these instruments in that, 
“whereas the Roadmap was originally intended to guarantee a minimum level of 
procedural protection throughout the EU in all criminal cases (cross-border as well as 
national); its application is limited to cross-border cases.”44 This contention that the 
Roadmap was based upon cross-border cases is based upon point 3 of the preamble of 
the Roadmap: 
 
“…the removal of internal borders and the increasing exercise 
of the rights to freedom of movement and residence have, as 
an inevitable consequence, led to an increase in the number of 
people becoming involved in criminal proceedings in a 
Member State other than that of their residence. In those 
situations, the procedural rights of the suspected or accused 
persons are particularly important in order to safeguard the 
right to a fair trial.” 
 
Thus from this perspective EU citizens who have exercised their right of free 
movement ought to have their fundamental rights safeguarded. If this different view is 
used to understand the Directive and the Proposed Directive regarding the need for a 
cross-border element, it must be asked why this would be the case. There is the 
argument which was put forward to prevent any initiatives in the field of suspects 
rights; that there is adequate protection provided by other international instruments. 
This is not, however, mirrored to the same degree in the case of the Framework 
Decision on Victims Rights. However it is submitted that such a view is 
unsatisfactory in light of the analysis of the proposed Directive. Furthermore, if this 
were the case, why bother legislating on this issue at all at EU level if it were seen to 
be efficiently dealt with at national and international level? 
 
Another view is that this issue impacts on national sovereignty and the protection of 
national interests, and as such the issues of victims’ rights are somewhat less 
controversial. One commentator noted these problems in relation to the PFWD but 
they are still relevant here:  
  
“Some Member States are concerned that a measure of this 
sort [the PFWD], which seeks to impose constraints on their 
domestic criminal justice systems, would infringe the 
subsidiarity principle by laying down rules governing the 
                                                           
44 L.van Puyenbroeck and G.Vermeulen supra. n.25 at p.1037  
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organisation of something that remains a matter of 
sovereignty.”45  
  
Thus it is likely that Member States would wish there to be a requirement for a cross-
border element so as to avoid wholly internal situations coming within the 
competence of the CJEU. Interestingly, it has been contended by some commentators 
that the requirement for a cross-border is a good idea: 
 
“Although this may seem to some a drawback, it is not. This 
approach offers an opportunity to introduce minimum EU 
standards in areas where such an exercise is needed, for 
instance in the field of cross-border traffic of evidence…”46  
 
Although it would be preferable that fundamental rights should be allowed to take 
precedence even when fundamental freedoms have not been exercised in the case of 
rights of suspects47, it is contended that there is no legal basis for this. Article 82(2) 
and Article 83 TEU both make reference to PJCC matters which have a cross-border 
dimension. Thus it is submitted that although following the line of rulings on the 
rights of victims would be preferable, the Court does not appear to have a legal base 
to rule on wholly internal matters as the legislation relates to a cross-border 
dimension. It is not the role of the Court to make legislation and, it is argued, Treaty 
amendment would be required before the Court could deal with such matters. This 
would be, it is submitted, the optimal situation.    
 
4.6 Conclusion  
Of course one cannot definitively surmise what the Court’s case law may be in the 
future. However, the tools are there to provide some kind of suggestion as to how the 
Court may well rule on new issues, such as suspects and accused persons’ rights, in 
light of prior rulings. As has been pointed out by many commentators, the issue in this 
instance is not so much adopting directives in these areas but actually making changes 
in practice: 
 
“It is rather easy to formulate rights of citizens, rights of 
suspects, etc. But then the mentality of police officers, of other 
                                                           
45 C.Morgan supra. n.29 at p.203 
46 L.van Puyenbroeck and G.Vermeulen supra. n.25 at p.1037   
47 Especially in light of the fact that this has been the way that the recent CJEU case law has developed 
with regard to the standing of victims in criminal proceedings.  
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officials of criminal procedure, to create open-mindedness, 
and an inclination to improve the practices, well that’s the big 
challenge…”48 
 
Thus Member States may be brought before the CJEU for infringements of the 
directives (once the time limits for implementation have expired). This would in turn 
mean that there had been an infringement of a fundamental right. However it is not 
yet clear whether there would have to be a cross-border element, thus involving a 
fundamental freedom, for the Court to be involved.  
 
Essentially, the rights provided for by the new Directives and the proposed Directive 
provide an interesting opportunity for the Court to rule in a developing area of law. It 
is reasonable to ask whether there must be fundamental freedoms enacted in order to 
ensure fundamental rights are protected. Meanwhile the Directive on Interpretation 
and Translation may provide an example which lends itself to a cross-border element. 
This is not the case with the Directive on the Right to Information in Criminal 
Proceedings and the proposed Directive on the Right of Access to a Lawyer. It is 
contended that the Court should await a more clear legal base to allow them to follow 
the case law on the Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal 
Proceedings and permit cases which concern wholly internal situations.   
                                                           
48 Quote from Theo de Roos, a Dutch appeal court judge and law professor on Spotlight on Suspects 
Rights on euronews - http://prod-euronews,euronews.net/2012/06/11/spotlinght-on-suspects-rights/ 
accessed on 08/07/12 
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Conclusion  
 
The aim of this thesis was to address the question of: 
 
“Fundamental rights versus fundamental freedoms: A change 
in the reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union? A Critical Analysis of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’s Rulings in Police and Judicial Cooperation 
in Criminal Matters” 
 
The thesis has undertaken to do this by examining some of the diverse areas within 
the field of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). These 
selected areas were: standing of victims in criminal proceedings, the European arrest 
warrant; and, the rights of suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings.  
 
Firstly, however, the thesis explained the development of fundamental rights and 
PJCC generally before analysing the development of the Court’s own competence 
within this field. It was concluded that there has been a widespread move to include 
human rights arguments by the parties involved in the cases. It is suggested the 
contention put forward by Coppel and O’Neill however, that fundamental rights 
arguments were not being given the proper respect by the Court and were being 
‘trumped’ as it were by arguments which pertained to the fundamental freedoms is 
somewhat exaggerated and outdated, as suggested by Weiler and Lockhart. Moreover, 
it was argued that the changes to the jurisdiction of the Court, particularly those which 
are due to take place after the transitional period ends in 2014 in the area of PJCC are 
to be welcomed to allow the Court to consider issues of fundamental rights, as well as 
fundamental freedoms.  
 
The subsequent chapter dealt with the Framework Decision on the Standing of 
Victims in Criminal Proceedings. This chapter investigated the detail of the 
Framework Decision and the cases and rulings which have been delivered to date. 
This chapter concluded that as a result of the lack of a requirement for a cross-border 
element, there is much less emphasis on fundamental freedoms. In other words free 
movement is still relevant, but there is a stronger emphasis on fundamental rights. The 
 Word Count: 32474                                                                       94 of 102 
 
prior importance of the cross-border element to the Court was highlighted by a 
discussion of case law on ‘wholly internal’ situations. It was also concluded that at 
times the Court does not give fundamental rights a thorough enough examination and 
can be somewhat flippant in their treatment of the issues. However, it was pointed out 
that the somewhat limited case law on this Directive should not be over emphasised. 
 
The next chapter was that which considered the Framework Decision on the European 
arrest warrant (EAW). This chapter concluded that at the very heart of the EAW is the 
idea of crossing a border, which results in an accusation or a conviction at a later 
stage. It was contended in this case that although fundamental freedoms are important 
to the EAW, fundamental rights are of great significance as a result of issues such as 
double criminality, in absentia trials and ne bis in idem, which has been of particular 
import with regard to the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA). 
It was concluded in this instance that fundamental rights and freedoms are, at times, 
actually pitted against mutual trust and recognition as opposed to against each other.  
 
The final chapter is concerned with the Roadmap on procedural rights for suspects 
and accused persons and the respective directives which have been adopted. As yet 
there has not been any case law in this area but using the analysis of the Directives 
and the prior case law from the previous chapters, suggestions were put forward as to 
how the Court may decide these issues. It is concluded that there is a major 
opportunity for the Court to put fundamental rights at the top of any hierarchy of 
norms and allow cases which are based upon ‘wholly internal’ situations.  
 
To conclude, it was once said that: 
 
“Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a 
little Temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety”1  
 
This is something which the law-makers in the EU should be wary of. It is particularly 
interesting in the context of the often criticised EAW which was considered a knee 
jerk reaction to events on September 11, 20012. Long criticised for creating legislation 
in the field of PJCC which was centred upon prosecution, there was, and still is, a 
                                                           
1 Benjamin Franklin as cited in http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/1381.html  
2 Although notably the piece of legislation had already been in the pipeline, this undoubtedly speeded 
up the process of finalising the Framework Decision 
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need to adopt legislative measures which counter-balances this in order to protect 
freedom at its most basic level. Thus, the Court has the important role of protecting 
those fundamental rights which are, perhaps, more obviously essential in terms of 
criminal law as opposed to more economically based fields of EU law. Given this is 
an area which Member States consider the EU is impinging national sovereignty, it is 
paramount the Court, as well as the other EU institutions, consider these matters 
appropriately. In turn then, it is perhaps not surprising that fundamental freedoms are 
taking a lesser role in some cases resulting in the elimination of the cross-border 
requirement. On the contrary though, perhaps because of the area’s importance to 
Member States, it perhaps is surprising that the Court has decided to delve into 
matters which are considered to be ‘wholly internal’ situations. Thus it is concluded 
that fundamental rights are taking a higher precedence in the field of PJCC to 
fundamental freedoms. However at times the Court’s rulings on fundamental rights 
has still been lacking. Moreover, it is contended that it is not simply fundamental 
rights and freedoms which are competing but sometimes fundamental rights compete 
with each other. Sometimes it is competing fundamental rights and the freedoms 
combined which compete with the ‘cornerstone’ of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, that is, mutual recognition and trust. The PJCC has provided for a particularly 
interesting study with regard to fundamental rights and freedoms, and is set to 
continue to be with new legislative measures to protect the suspects and accused 
persons in criminal proceedings.    
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